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ABSTRACT 
The traditional role of the active-duty military force at home is one of 
support to a civilian Lead Federal Agency (LFA) that primarily falls under the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  During emergencies, military 
domestic assistance is historically provided when local, state, and federal 
resources have been overwhelmed.  During and in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, however, the slow and perceived inept response to the massive 
disaster prompted a national debate on the appropriate role of the military in 
response to major domestic disasters.  Many concerned with the federal 
response to Katrina believed that America’s homeland security system could 
not aptly respond to a large-scale natural or man-made catastrophe without 
the military in a lead role.  Defining the roles and understanding the 
responsibilities outlined for the Department of Defense (DOD) within the 
National Response Plan (NRP) is an important first step toward an effectively 
coordinated Federal domestic incident response. 
The purpose of this research is to explore the role of the active-duty 
military in domestic disaster response, using Hurricane Katrina, to determine 
if DOD and DHS response to the disaster was implemented according to the 
NRP.  This research will help to explain the role that the military plays in 
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I. INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
On the 29th of August, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, one of the most powerful 
hurricanes in United States history, made landfall along the gulf coast areas of 
Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi.1  The devastation caused by the storm was 
witnessed by people around the world through multiple media outlets.  Local, 
state and federal government came under sharp criticism by the American public 
when the response, particularly to the devastated city of New Orleans, Louisiana 
was slow and inept.2  
Nationwide, citizens and lawmakers demanded to know why fellow 
Americans on the gulf coast failed to receive a quality federal response to the 
disaster.  Many also questioned why the military was not called in sooner to help 
the obviously overwhelmed state and local governments, particularly after the 
levees were breached in the city of New Orleans.  The slow and perceived inept 
response to the massive disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina shattered the 
belief that America’s homeland security system could aptly respond to a large-
scale natural or man-made catastrophe. 
The purpose of this research is to explore the role of the military in 
domestic disaster response, using Hurricane Katrina as a case study, to 
determine first, if the Department of Defense (DOD) (active-duty military) 
response to Hurricane Katrina was implemented according to the National 
Response Plan (NRP) and second, whether the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) (FEMA/Coast Guard) response was implemented according to 
the NRP. 
Just days after Hurricane Katrina struck the gulf coast states, President 
George W. Bush held a press conference in the devastated city of New Orleans.  
                                            
1 Henry B. Hogue and Keith Bea. CRS Report for Congress, Federal Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security Organization: Historical Developments and Legislative 
Options, Jun 1, 2006, 1. 
2 See U.S. Congress. U.S House of Representatives, House Committee on Government 
Reform, A First Look at Lessons Learned From Katrina, Sep 15, 2005. 
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During his speech, he lauded the Department of Defense for their comprehensive 
response to Katrina.  The President cited the military as “the institution of our 
government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment's 
notice.”3  He also publicly called upon the Congress to consider an expansion of 
the military’s response role in a catastrophic domestic disaster.4  This public 
proposal to expand the military’s role set off a national debate on the appropriate 
role of the military in domestic disaster response. 
The traditional role of the active-duty military force at home is one of 
support to a civilian Lead Federal Agency (LFA) that usually falls under DHS.  
However, during his speech in New Orleans, the President explained that the 
task of recovering from a catastrophe the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina may 
require an expansion of military authority.5  President Bush’s proposal to expand 
military authority was met with strong opposition shortly after its announcement.  
This contentious issue may eventually broaden the rift between governors’ offices 
and the White House over homeland security and emergency management.  It 
also has the potential to widen the gap between federal policies and local 
emergency management imperatives. 
Hurricane Katrina is an intrinsically important case that has shifted the 
debate on the appropriate role of the military in disaster response.  This research 
will help explain the role that the military plays in supporting the civilian LFA in 
disaster response.  Understanding this role will help DOD plan, prepare and 
respond more effectively to future disasters.  In the on-going Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT), understanding the role the military plays before, during and 
after a disaster can not only help improve our nation's ability to manage natural 
disasters, but can potentially enhance future consequence management 
capabilities necessary to respond to a terrorist attack. 
                                            
3  White House.  News release: President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to Nation. 
Office of the Press Secretary, Sep 15, 2005, 




Moreover, national consensus on the appropriate role for the military will 
allow senior DOD leaders to begin appropriately structuring the active duty force 
for the role (either support or lead) they will ultimately play in domestic disaster 
response.  The implications for budgets and other resources, manning levels, 
training and exercise requirements all impact the military’s ability to fulfill its 
primary mission of defending the homeland by conducting missions abroad.  The 
American public seeks reassurance that the federal government can adequately 
respond to the needs of its citizens after a large scale natural or manmade 
disaster on American soil. 
This report will argue that expanding the military’s role to lead the disaster 
response effort is not the best strategy for improving federal disaster response.  
Rather, the focus ought to be upon the implementation process within federal 
plans (i.e. the National Response Plan). 
The goal of this research is three-fold.  The first goal is to help the 
intended audience (White House, Congress, DHS, DOD, American public) better 
understand the National Response Plan (NRP) and the roles and missions for 
active-duty military forces within the construct of Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities (DSCA) under the NRP.  This includes the Request for Assistance 
(RFA) process and known legal limitations within the system. 
The second goal is to outline a Hurricane Katrina response timeline for 
DOD and DHS to help identify any gaps during NRP implementation. 
The third goal is to explore the DOD lessons learned from Hurricane 
Katrina and consider some of the political and social implications of expanding 
the military role in disaster response. 
Finally, the report will culminate with conclusions and recommendations, 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
 Since the events following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina occurred 
just over one year ago from the date of this report, much of the scholarly work 
analyzing the response is currently being written.  As a result, this report will 
include an information cut-off date (ICO) for its research of September 15, 2006.   
A literature review of existing schools of thought or views on the response 
to Hurricane Katrina surveys official government reports, transcripts of interviews, 
editorials, scholarly articles, public opinions and relevant books.  This report will 
focus on general views in the literature regarding the DOD response to Katrina 
and the proposal to expand the military role.  The views considered are:  the 
government perspective (White House, Congress and state/local governments), 
the Pentagon and DHS perspective (civilian, DOD/DHS, military and National 
Guard views) and the public perspective (political parties, scholars, think tanks, 
and special interest groups).   
B. GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES 
A Pew poll following Katrina found that after the hurricane, “the public’s 
focus shifted for the first time since the September 11 attacks from the war on 
terrorism to domestic policy.”6  Addressing the shift in public concern, the federal 
government discussed engaging in bipartisan discussions to address factors that 
led to a slow federal response in the aftermath of Katrina.  President George W. 
Bush announced to the nation in an address from Jackson Square in New 
Orleans, LA, that he wanted “to know all the facts about the government 
response to Hurricane Katrina.”7  According to the President,  
Americans have every right to expect a more effective response in a 
time of emergency.  When the federal government fails to meet such 
an obligation, I, as President, am responsible for the problem, and for 
                                            
6 John Cochran. “Debacles, Delay and Disarray.” CQ Weekly, Oct 3, 2005, Pg. 2636, 
http://library.cqpress.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport109-
000001893679&type=hitlist&num=10& (accessed on Nov 17, 2005). 
7 President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation, Sep 15, 2005. 
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the solution.  So I've ordered every Cabinet Secretary to participate in 
a comprehensive review of the government response to the hurricane.8 
During that same address to the nation, President Bush called upon the 
Congress to consider granting greater authority to the military in disaster 
response.9  The national debate on the federal response to Katrina that followed 
produced three major lessons learned reports from the federal government:  a 
White House report, a Senate report and a House of Representatives report.   
 The White House report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 
Lessons Learned, February 2006, acknowledged the failure of federal, state and 
local authorities to prepare and respond to Hurricane Katrina.  In it, the DOD was 
mentioned as one of the only departments able to translate Presidential 
decisions into operational capabilities.10   
The report also recommended that DOD and DHS jointly plan response 
activities and ensure integration of guard and active duty forces.11  Additionally, 
White House officials acknowledged that unified command and interagency 
processes must be improved.12  Frances Fragos Townsend, White House 
Homeland Security Adviser, emphasized that during a major catastrophe, "… the 
United States military may be the only entity available to the federal government 
to protect the American people."13  As a result, the White House predicted that 
the Pentagon might take over the commanding role during catastrophes of 
“extraordinary scope and nature.”14 
                                            
8 President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the Nation, Sep 15, 2005. 
9 Ibid. 
10 White House. Fact Sheet: The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 
Office of the Press Secretary, Feb 23, 2006, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/0223.html (accessed on May 4, 2006). 
11 White House.  The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington 
D.C., Feb 23, 2006, 94. 
12 Ibid, 70. 
13 Adina Postelnicu. “Greater military role is urged; White House's Katrina Report Lists 
Lessons,” The Biloxi Sun Herald, Feb 24, 2006. 
14 Fact Sheet: The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, Feb 23, 2006. 
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The House report also commented on the need for improved integration, 
communications, coordination and information sharing between and within DOD 
and DHS.15  It specifically noted that the military response was hampered by the 
lack of an information-sharing protocol to enhance situational awareness within 
military units and integration between Guard and active forces.16  It also stated 
that DOD, governors and state officials failed to actively participate in joint 
planning for both natural and man-made emergencies.17  The report claimed this 
“contributed to tension” during Katrina response operations.  It also cited DOD as 
having “too few ‘civilian authorities’ in their military assistance to civilian authority 
planning.”18  The Additional Views Presented by the Select Committee on Behalf 
of Rep. Charlie Melancon and Rep. William J. Jefferson did note that a gap 
existed in the House report because it failed to address how and why the failures 
occurred, why they weren’t corrected and who was responsible.19   
In Congress, legislative members had the tendency to propose the 
reorganization of federal agencies like the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) to solve the federal disaster response problem, when the 
solution may be much simpler.20  As of May 30, 2006, eleven bills were 
                                            
15 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina, Feb 2006, 202-204. 
16 Ibid, 218, 224. 
17 Ibid, 222. 
18 Ibid. 
19 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Feb 15, 2006: Additional Views Presented by 
the Select Committee on Behalf of Rep. Charlie Melancon and Rep. William J. Jefferson. 
Washington, D.C., Feb 2006. 
20 The eleven FEMA Reorganization bills introduced in Congress were: H.R. 3659, 4493, 
3816, 3685, 3656, 2302, 1615, 4840, 4009.  H.R. 5316 and 5451 were ordered reported by 
committee, GovTrack.us:  Tracking the United States Congress, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-3659 (accessed on Jun 17, 2006).  See 
GovTrack.us for a summary of the pending legislation as a result of Hurricane Katina.  Of the 
eleven bills sponsored (as of 30 May 06), eight involve some type of restructuring of FEMA.  The 
other three remaining bills put emergency management activities under DHS.  Also see Hogue 
and Bea’s Jun 1, 06 CRS Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security 
Organization: Historical Developments and Legislative Options. 
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introduced to improve disaster response.  Eight of the bills introduced by the 
legislature were to reestablish FEMA as an independent agency.21 
 Within the House of Representatives, members on the House Armed 
Services Committee (HASC) wanted the President to spell out his plans for the 
military’s broader role in disaster response.22  They were wary of the military 
leading emergency response and felt the decision could inadvertently harm 
readiness and the military’s ability to protect the homeland.23    
The Senate report, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, May 
2006, was more focused on ensuring the government highlighted the problems 
with coordination and unity of effort among active-duty, Guard and DHS 
personnel than who led the response efforts.  The report cited the DOD with 
insufficient preparations and lack of coordination with state governors.24  Senator 
Joseph I. Lieberman, Ranking Member, Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, concluded that the lack of unity of command, especially in 
Louisiana, was a key failure in the federal government’s response.25 
The Senate said it would consider holding hearings if a more specific 
proposal was developed regarding the President’s proposal to expand the 
military disaster response role.  Because this issue would affect the power of the 
states and increase the power of the federal government, the Senate Armed 
                                            
21 Hogue and Bea, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security Organization: 
Historical Developments and Legislative Options, 21. 
22 William Matthews. “Disaster response: Weak Reception for Bush's Proposal to Broaden 
Military's Role in Domestic Emergencies,” Armed Forces Journal, Nov 1, 2005. 
23 "Panel Chair Urges Caution in Expanding Federal Role in Disaster Response." Defense 
Daily 228, no. 25 (Nov 10, 2005): 1, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=924788361&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=P
QD (accessed on Nov 17, 2005). 
24 U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, May 2006, Ch 26-68 to 26-70. 
25 Joseph I. Lieberman. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared: Additional Views on 
White House Katrina Failures, Administration Lack of Cooperation with the Investigation, and 
Failure to Establish Unified Command, May 2006, 33. 
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Services Committee (SASC) believed the issue definitely merited a close 
review.26 
 State and local levels of government expressed strong opposition to an 
expansion in military authority during disasters.  They generally argued that the 
current system was grounded in the constitution and preserved states rights.  
Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee (R) sounded off at a Governors’ Association 
meeting by saying, “It's a bad idea for the military to make that decision and 
usurp the authority that under the U.S. Constitution stays with the governor and 
local authorities.”27 
In sum, there was no real consensus on an approach or method to modify 
the current national disaster response plans – this is a major impediment to 
progress.  This report will attempt to weigh in on the debates with additional 
research on where in the Katrina response timeline the implementation flaws 
surfaced. 
C. PENTAGON AND DHS PERSPECTIVES 
The military and the civilian leadership in the Pentagon generally agree 
that the military’s daily job is focused on preventing, deterring and defeating 
attacks against the homeland.28  DOD and DHS remained cautious and 
somewhat quiet on this issue of expanding the military role in disaster response.  
Unless asked to testify at hearings, officials made few public statements on this 
specific issue.  Instead, the leadership at DHS and DOD combined efforts on this 
important issue and sent correspondence to President Bush seeking a greater 
understanding of the conditions for an expanded military role in disaster 
                                            
26 David E. Sanger. "Bush Wants to Consider Broadening of Military's Powers during Natural 
Disasters." New York Times, Sep 27, 2005, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=902670581&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=P
QD (accessed on May 11, 2006).  
27 “States Oppose Military Disaster Role.” Associated Press, Nov 05, 2005, 
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,79944,00.html (accessed on May 11, 2006). 
28 "Northern Command Integrating Lessons Learned from Katrina." US Fed News Service, 
Including US State News (Mar 14, 2006): n/a, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1004052921&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=
PQD (accessed on May 7, 2006).  
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response.29  In a joint letter from Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, both acknowledged that 
active-duty military troops might be needed to respond to a “catastrophic” 
event.30  The letter asked the President to further define the scope and duration 
of an expanded DOD role for such an event.31  It also asserted that there was a 
clear “expectation that a non-DOD Federal civilian lead would assume lead 
responsibility at the earliest opportunity, consistent with operational 
requirements.32  One strong dissenting view on the subject came from Lt. Gen H. 
Steven Blum, National Guard Chief.  He claimed that when a catastrophe hit, 
there could be only one person in charge—“elected governors,” illustrating the 
on-going battle over power between federal and state governments. 
D. PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES  
 From a political party perspective, both Republicans and Democrats were 
extremely cautious about expanding the military’s role in disaster response.  
There was widespread concern that an expanded role could upset the balance of 
civil-military relations.33  Some Washington think tanks did not agree with 
federalizing domestic disaster response.  Unsurprisingly, Gene Healy, senior 
editor at the Cato Institute, warned that “Putting full-time warriors into a civilian 
policing situation can result in serious collateral damage to American life and 
liberty….” His statement hit a perpetual theme among those who seek to enlist 
military support for their position by adding, “it can also undermine military 
readiness.”34  From the academic community, Richard Kohn of the University of 
North Carolina was not in favor of an expanded military role.  He claimed that, 
                                            
29 Donald Rumsfeld and Michael Chertoff.  Memorandum for the President:  “Katrina After-
Action Lessons Learned Recommendation that DOD and DHS Determine when the Department 
of Defense Would be Involved in a Catastrophic Event—Natural or Man-Made,” Apr 7, 2006. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Donald Rumsfeld and Michael Chertoff.  Memorandum for the President, Apr 7, 2006. 
33 “States Oppose Military Disaster Role,” Nov 5, 2005. 
34 Matthews, “Disaster response: Weak Reception for Bush's Proposal to Broaden Military's 
Role in Domestic Emergencies.” 
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"disaster response is a civil function.”35  Others in defense-related agencies 
agreed with him.36   
 Similarly, several Washington think tanks and civil libertarians did not 
support an increased role for the active-duty military.37  Talk of the military’s 
expanded role potentially bringing the nation closer to martial law was 
commonplace throughout civil libertarian circles.  The American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) called the proposal “a very bad idea" with "unforeseen 
consequences for civil liberties."38  Overall, the views showed there was general 
consensus that a shift in roles could possibly affect civil-military relations and 
would detract the military from its primary mission of fighting and winning wars. 
                                            
35 Matthews, “Disaster response: Weak Reception for Bush's Proposal to Broaden Military's 
Role in Domestic Emergencies.” 
36 Ibid. 
37 Mark Sappenfield. "Battle Brews Over a Bigger Military Role; the Pentagon Tilts Toward 
Taking More Authority in Major Disasters - Worrying Governors, Lawmakers." The Christian 
Science Monitor, Dec 13, 2005, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=940346321&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=P
QD, (accessed Mar 6, 2006). 
38 Matthews, “Disaster response: Weak Reception for Bush's Proposal to Broaden Military's 
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III. REASEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
Based on a preliminary review of the literature, it quickly became evident 
that more questions than answers existed for this topic.  For the purpose of this 
report, however, four key questions were the primary focus of this research:  
• What is a National Response Plan (NRP) and what disaster 
response role is designated for the DOD active-duty military? 
 
• Does the current construct of the NRP give the military and other 
key agencies the ability to share critical information during disaster 
response?   
 
• Did the active duty military performance during Hurricane Katrina 
versus DHS performance provide evidence that greater DOD 
authority is needed during a federal response to a domestic 
catastrophe?   
 
• Will placing the military in the lead role solve the federal 
government’s disaster response problems?   
 
This research will answer these questions and argue that a flawed 
implementation of the April 2004 NRP, as well as flaws within the NRP itself, led 
to a slow federal response during Hurricane Katrina.  It will also argue that 
putting the military in the lead role in disaster response does not, in and of itself, 
solve the problem of an inept federal response to a catastrophic disaster.  
This report will support the argument by using an in-case comparative 
study of the DOD (active-duty military) and DHS (FEMA/Coast Guard) response 
during Hurricane Katrina.  Using the timeline and the NRP process, the report will 
test the prescribed procedures in the NRP against the implementation of those 
procedures during Hurricane Katrina.  Furthermore, evidence will be used to 
determine whether or not a flawed implementation of the NRP or flaws within the 
NRP contributed to an inept federal response during Hurricane Katrina.  Primary 
sources (speeches, interviews, official reports, doctrine, policies and declarations 
by government officials) as well as secondary sources (books, scholarly journal 
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IV. WHAT IS THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN? 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States 
found itself challenged with a potentially deadly asymmetric threat environment 
and a spectrum of man-made and natural hazards.39  The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security; Homeland Security Act of 2002; and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, outlined 
clear objectives for a national approach: “to prevent terrorist attacks within the 
United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and 
other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies that occur.”40 
In an effort to ensure the objectives were met and requirements 
implemented, the President of the United States mandated, through HSPD-5, 
that a new National Response Plan (NRP) be developed to “align Federal 
coordinating structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, 
and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management.”41  The premise 
behind the NRP was to establish a single, comprehensive, national framework of 
structures and mechanisms to conduct domestic incident management.  The goal 
of the plan was to provide coordinated operations and resources at the federal 
level to support state, local and tribal incident managers “by increasing the 
speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of incident management.”42  In short, the 
NRP would be a national roadmap to guide U.S. federal response during a major 
or catastrophic disaster.   
 
 
                                            
39 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004, at 
www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRPbaseplan.pdf (accessed September 3, 2006), 1. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, i. 
42 Ibid, i, iii. 
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B. FOUNDATION AND ACTIVATION 
1. National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
The NRP was built on the foundational model of the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS), published on March 1, 2004.43  The NIMS 
provides a standardized and unified incident management template that aligns 
command, control, organizational structure, terminology, communication 
protocols, resources and resource-typing for synchronization of response efforts 
at all echelons of government.44  It also “integrates existing best practices into a 
consistent, nationwide approach”45 to enable a more collaborative domestic 
incident management at all levels.   
Using the comprehensive framework of the NIMS, the NRP is able to 
provide national-level policy and operational direction between governments and 
the private sectors.46  This framework is consistent “at all jurisdictional levels, 
regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident.”47  As authors 
Christopher Cooper and Robert Block describe in their book, Disaster: Hurricane 
Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security, the NIMS was mandated “to 
ensure all levels of government were working from the same playbook during a 
disaster.  Its bedrock principle: one incident, one commander—no matter how 
many agencies send help.”48  The consistent framework of the NIMS allows the 
NRP to always remain in effect.49  The plan does, however, have the flexibility to 
be activated either fully or partially for a variety of incidents or emergencies.50     
                                            
43 NRP, 1. 
44 Ibid, i. 
45 United States. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, 
March 1, 2004, at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/nims_doc_full.pdf (accessed 
September 3, 2006), 3. 
46 NRP, 1. 
47 Ibid, i. 
48 Christopher Copper and Robert Block. Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of 
Homeland Security. 1st ed. New York: Times Books, 2006, 277. 
49 NIMS, 1. 
50 NRP, i. 
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2. Incident of National Significance (INS) 
 In addition to covering the full spectrum of incident management and 
emergency assistance activities, the NRP may be activated for a specific Incident 
of National Significance (INS).51  The plan defines an INS as: an actual or 
potential high-impact event that requires robust coordination of the Federal 
response in order to save lives, minimize damage and provide the basis for long-
term community and economic recovery.52 
When appropriate, it is the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the White House and other agencies, who declares Incidents of 
National Significance.  As further guidance, HSPD-5 sets forth the following four 
specific criteria for an INS:    
1. A Federal department or agency, responding under its own 
authorities, requests DHS assistance 
 
2. Resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed  
a. Stafford Act major disasters or emergencies 
b. Other catastrophic incidents  
 
3. More than one Federal department or agency is involved 
a. Credible threats or indications of imminent terrorist 
attack  
b. Threats/incidents related to high-profile, large-scale 
events 
 
4. The President directs DHS to assume responsibility for 
incident management.53 
 
An important exception to the criteria listed above for the designation of an 
INS is also noted in the NRP.  When a major disaster declaration is given by the 
President under authority granted in Title V of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), the particular incident 
automatically becomes an Incident of National Significance.54  This will be 
                                            
51 NRP, i. 
52 Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, 2. 
53 NRP, 4. 
54 Ibid, 7. 
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addressed later in Chapter VI of this report.  Additionally, since incidents are 
typically managed at the lowest possible organizational, geographic and 
jurisdictional level,55 the NRP does not attempt to impede or change the ability of 
a Federal agency to carry out any specific authorities given under applicable 
directives, laws or Executive orders.56   
In sum, for incidents that require a coordinated Federal response, the 
national, state or local authorities may continue their normal procedures, using 
the NIMS framework, to respond to disasters that are less severe than an INS.57  
As such, the NRP does not apply to most incidents that occur each year and are 
handled locally with existing authorities and plans.     
C. DEVELOPMENT  
The Department of Homeland Security, directed by the President of the 
United States, led the multiagency development of the NRP.  Both the product 
and process of development was truly a national effort.  Comprehensive and 
extensive coordination and discussion of lessons learned and best practices took 
place with various members from Federal, state, local, tribal, NGO, private-sector 
entities and emergency managers nationwide.58   
During development, the NRP incorporated relevant portions of the 
Federal Response Plan (FRP), U.S. Government Domestic Terrorism Concept of 
Operations Plan (CONPLAN), Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan 
(FRERP), Initial NRP (INRP) and other national-level contingency plans.59  This 
multiagency effort produced a 58-page Initial National Response Plan (INRP) 
that was expanded to a full 426-page National Response Plan document, 
released in December 2004.  This full version NRP supersedes all previously 
                                            
55 Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, 3. 
56 NRP, 2, 6. 
57 Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, 1. 
58 NRP, i. 
59 Ibid, ix, 1. 
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noted plans and is essentially the United States’ new playbook for national 
emergency response.   
D. STRUCTURE 
The NRP structure includes a Base Plan, Appendices, Emergency 
Support Function (ESF) Annexes, Support Annexes and Incident Annexes.60  
The main component of the NRP is its base plan which describes the domestic 
incident management structures and processes.61  It details roles and 
responsibilities, incident management actions and various planning assumptions.  
The plan also includes appendices that contain acronyms, definitions, authorities, 
and a compendium of national interagency plans.62   
The full 426-page NRP contains 15 ESF Annexes63 which describe the 
roles and responsibilities for the common activities that would support the 
majority of domestic incidents.  The nine Support Annexes to the NRP provide 
guidance for the functional processes and administrative requirements to 
facilitate efficient and effective incident management.64    
The plan also contains the following seven incident annexes65 that outline 
contingency or hazard situations (organized alphabetically) requiring specialized 
application of the NRP:   
• Biological Incident 
• Catastrophic Incident 
• Cyber Incident 
• Food and Agriculture Incident (to be published in a subsequent 
version of the plan) 
• Nuclear/Radiological Incident 
                                            
60 See Figure 1, Organization of the National Response Plan, NRP, xii.  
61 The Base Plan includes the entire 114-page document (base plan and appendices).  It 
does not include the annexes. 
62 NRP, 63-96. 
63 See Figure 2, Emergency Support Functions, NRP, 12. 
64 NRP, SUP-i. 
65 See full-text NRP for a detailed look at all incident annexes. 
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• Oil and Hazardous Materials Incident 
• Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation.66 
A summary of the full NRP structure is as follows: 
Base Plan: Concept of Operations, Coordinating Structures, Roles and 
Responsibilities, Definitions, etc. 
 
Appendixes: Glossary, Acronyms, Authorities, and Compendium of 
National Interagency Plans 
 
Emergency Support Function Annexes (15)67: Groups capabilities & 
resources into functions most likely needed during an incident (e.g., 
Firefighting, Transportation, Mass Care, etc.) 
 
Support Annexes (9): Describes common processes and specific 
administrative requirements (e.g., Public Affairs, Financial 
Management, Worker Safety & Health, etc.) 
 
Incident Annexes (7): Organized alphabetically.  Outlines core 
procedures, roles and responsibilities for specific contingencies (e.g., 
Bio, Radiological, Cyber, HAZMAT Spills, and Catastrophic 
incidents).68 
 
Within the NRP, each annex describes the “policies, situation, concept of 
operations, and responsibilities pertinent to the type of incident in question.”69  
Catastrophic incidents such as the September 11 attacks, for example, would be 
addressed separately in the Catastrophic Incident Annex and under the 
Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.70 
                                            
66 NRP, INC-i. 
67 NRP, 12.  See Figure 2 for the scope of the Emergency Support Function Annexes. 
68 Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, 2.  See the full text NRP for the 
plan’s structure and layout.  Also see Figure 1 for an overview of the NRP organization. 
69 NRP, INC-i. 
70 Ibid. 
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One important note to highlight is that the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident 
Annex states that an NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) will be 
published and released separately at a later date upon approval.71  This 
supplement will be a “more detailed and operationally specific”72 document 
designated “For Official Use Only.”73  As of the writing of this report, this 
document has not been published. 
E. IMPLEMENTATION 
Upon release of the NRP in December 2004, then Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Tom Ridge, emphasized that the effective implementation of the NRP 
would require “extensive cooperation, collaboration, and information-sharing 
across jurisdictions, as well as between the government and the private sector at 
all levels.”74  As such, a letter of agreement within the NRP was signed by 32 
departments and agencies.  It is important to note that the letter represented a 
pledge from those signatories to provide cooperation, resources and support to 
DHS in the implementation of the NRP.75   
Since release and implementation of the full NRP, White House officials 
have called for revisions to the plan in light of lessons learned from the response 
to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.76  As a result, DHS released a 49-page Notice of 
Change to the National Response Plan, updating various elements of the 
December 2004 NRP.  The modifications to the NRP were coordinated through 





                                            
71 NRP, CAT-1 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 NRP, i. 
75 NRP, iii-viii. 
76 White House Report, 88. 
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released on May 25, 2006.  For operational purposes, all the modifications are 
considered part of the NRP pending a revision and reissuance of the full 
document.77 
                                            
77 Notice of Change to the National Response Plan, 1. 
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V. SHARING INFORMATION DURING EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE 
Incidents of National Significance require the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to coordinate operations and/or resources, and may…require 
significant information-sharing at the unclassified and classified levels 
across multiple jurisdictions and between the public and private 
sectors.78 
 
A. WHY SHARED INFORMATION IS CRITICAL 
As the U.S. continues to execute the on-going Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT), understanding the role that information plays in disaster response will 
be vitally important.  This knowledge can not only help improve the nation's ability 
to manage domestic emergencies like earthquakes or hurricanes, but can 
potentially enhance future consequence management capabilities necessary to 
respond to man-made disasters or terrorist attacks. 
In the article, Information in a Disaster: Sharing Data is Key to Improved 
Response, Dr. Linton Wells II, the Department of Defense Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Networks and Information Integration, emphasized that 
federal agencies can better respond to domestic and international disasters “by 
sharing unclassified information effectively with state, local and tribal 
governments, nongovernmental organizations and relief entities.”79  Additionally, 
during his March 30, 2006 hearing testimony on information sharing for disaster 
response, Dr. Wells further explained to the House Committee on Government 
Reform, that “…information is absolutely critical.  Communications is one piece, 
but the goal, ultimately, is to share information.”80  When considering this 
                                            
78 NRP, 6. 
79 Linton Wells.  “Information in A Disaster: Sharing Data is Key to Improved Response.” 
Federal Times, July 10, 2006, 2006. 21, http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=1936598 
(accessed Jul 20, 2006).  
80 House Committee on Government Reform. US Representative Thomas M. Davis III (R-
VA) Holds a Hearing on Disaster Response Information Sharing. March 30, 2006, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/results/docview/docview.do?start=3&sort=RELEVANCE&format=GNBF
ULL&risb=21_T612272116 (accessed September 15, 2006).  
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statement in relation to the United States’ efforts to achieve this goal while 
managing domestic incidents, two important questions emerge: has the U.S. 
planned for information sharing during disaster response; and if so, how? 
One national-level effort that provides several venues to facilitate 
information sharing between federal, state, local and private sectors during a 
disaster can be found in the previously discussed NRP.  To better facilitate 
implementation of the national plan, a newly identified key organizational 
structure was recently chartered as a multiagency, information repository for 
domestic incident management.  This chapter will provide an overview and 
examination of the information-sharing structure within the NRP now known as 
the National Operations Center (NOC).  
B. NOC: NEW NRP COORDINATING MECHANISM 
A primary goal within the NRP is the ability to orchestrate a more 
coordinated response among federal, state and local organizations.  The concept 
of sharing critical information with decision makers and first responders when 
and where it is needed is vitally important.  Many of the NRP coordinating 
mechanisms are structured to facilitate information sharing.  One of the newly 
developed organizational structures in the NRP, the National Operations Center 
and its sub elements, will be examined. 
The National Operations Center, or NOC, is the new key coordinating 
mechanism within the NRP that was created with release of the Notice of 
Change to the National Response Plan in May 2006.  Replacing the Homeland 
Security Operations Center (HSOC), the NOC serves as the national hub for all 
information sharing, communications, and coordination pertaining to the 
prevention of terrorist attacks and domestic incident management.81  This 
interagency center is staffed with full-time employees from relevant agencies and 
departments, providing National-level coordination of Federal, state and local 
response to major domestic incidents.82  
                                            
81 NRP, 24. 
82 White House Report, 92. 
 25
1. Sub-elements 
As a multiagency center, the NOC links key headquarters components 
and is comprised of five sub-elements: Interagency Watch, National Response 
Coordination Center, Information and Analysis Component, National 
Infrastructure Coordination Center, and Operational Planning Element.83  A 
summary of the key responsibilities for each sub-element follows: 
The NOC – Interagency Watch (NOC-Watch): a standing 24/7 
interagency organization fusing law enforcement, national intelligence, 
emergency response, and private sector reporting.  Also facilitates 
HLS info-sharing and operational coordination with other Federal, 
State, local, tribal, and NGO Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs).  
 
National Response Coordination Center (NOC-NRCC): monitors 
potential or developing incidents, supports regional/field components 
with national-level emergency response/specialized teams and 
resources.  Coordinates with Regional Response Coordination Centers 
(RRCCs) and operates 24/7 during an incident. 
 
Intelligence and Analysis (NOC-I&A): responsible for interagency 
intelligence collection requirements, analysis, production, and product 
dissemination for DHS.  Coordinates or disseminates DHS threat 
warnings, advisory bulletins, and other info pertinent to national 
incident mgt to Federal, State, regional, local, and NGO EOCs, 
incident management officials and private sector.  
 
National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NOC-NICC): monitors the 
Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR).  During an 
incident, provides a coordinating forum to share info across 
infrastructure KR sectors through info-sharing entities such as the 
Information Sharing & Analysis Centers and Sector Coordinating 
Councils.  To foster info sharing/coordination, private sector reps from 
CI/KR may provide info to the NOC-NICC.  
 
Interagency Planning Element (NOC-Planning): conducts strategic 
level ops incident mgt planning/coordination.  Responsible for strategic 
level ops planning, including coordinating response/recovery/mitigation 
ops planning and interagency coordination with NOC-NRCC; 
                                            
83 Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, 6. 
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coordinating and sustaining Federal preparedness, prevention and 
protection activities related to an INS or at the Secretary’s direction; 
and coordinating preparedness, prevention and protection ops, 
resource allocation and planning with Federal departments and 
agencies, NOC-NRCC, RRCCs and JFO.84 
 
Combined, the five sub-elements of the NOC are designed to ensure that 
information flows horizontally and vertically between key national emergency 
response organizations.  The ultimate goal is to quickly and effectively 
disseminate needed information to the decision-making agencies and individuals 
that need it most. 
2. Impact at National Level 
 At the national level, the NOC also engages in pre-incident actions and 
“facilitates interagency information-sharing and planning activities to enable the 
assessment, prevention, or resolution of a potential incident.”85  Additionally, the 
NOC reformulates the mission of the former Interagency Incident Management 
Group (IIMG) as a senior advisory council and adjudication body for the 
Secretary of Homeland Security.86   
As the Federal incident manager, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
would depend on the NOC for timely and vital information on all aspects of a 
domestic incident.  To help facilitate this important mission, all agency and 
department command centers are responsible for providing information to the 
NOC to assist in their ability to develop a real-time common operating picture for 
the White House and all other agencies during a domestic emergency.87  This 
makes the reach-back capability of the personnel in the NOC a crucial element 
for nurturing a strong information-sharing environment.   
Given the important goal of effectively and efficiently provide critical 
information to decision makers and response agencies that need it the most, the 
                                            
84 Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, 6-7. 
85 Ibid, 9. 
86 Ibid, 4. 
87 White House Report, 92. 
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NOC clearly plays a vital role in the overall success of domestic incident 
management.  Together with other agencies in the Federal, state and local, NGO 
and private sectors, this new multiagency coordinating mechanism within the 
NRP is designed to better facilitate critical information-sharing activities.  If run 
properly, the NOC will more effectively manage the key processes that must be 
accomplished during domestic incident management.   
C. INFORMATION SHARING: KEY TO DISASTER RESPONSE 
As the federal government begins its journey to transform “from a need-to-
know information-sharing environment, to a need to share”88 environment, the 
National Response Plan will play an important role.  In striving to unify the 
nation’s capabilities to prevent, prepare, respond and recover from all hazards 
and asymmetrical threats—whether earthquakes, dirty bombs, hurricanes or 
nuclear incidents—the NRP has laid out a solid blueprint for successful 
coordination.  The United States has attempted to institute organizational 
structures within the NRP for information sharing during disaster response.   
The comprehensive, national approach to domestic incident management 
provides a general concept of operations that helps the President of the United 
States ensure resources are quickly and efficiently applied to any Incident of 
National Significance.89  The established mechanisms to enhance information-
sharing and provide a more proactive federal response to catastrophic incidents 
are visible within the plan.  Additionally, the organizational structures within the 
NRP are established to ensure information is coordinated and communicated 
“from the local to regional to national headquarters level.”90   
It is the coordinating mechanisms within the National Response Plan, 
particularly the new 24/7 multiagency National Operations Center, that serve as 
useful conduits for information sharing and interagency coordination with 
                                            
88 US Representative Thomas M. Davis III (R-VA) Holds a Hearing on Disaster Response 
Information Sharing, Mar 30, 2006, 4. 
89 NRP, 15. 
90 Ibid, 24 
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Federal, state, local, tribal, NGO and private sector entities.91  The true measure 
of success, however, is not in the organizational structure or coordinating 
mechanisms of the NRP.  Success lies in the effective implementation of the 
plan; where individual actors have knowledge of their identified roles and actually 
perform the outlined responsibilities.  Simply put, it is essentially up to individuals 
executing the plan to ensure coordination takes place and that leaders in key 
positions receive relevant and timely information.   
As U.S. Representative Bill Pascrell Jr. aptly noted during a joint 
subcommittee hearing on military/national guard disaster response, “the National 
Response Plan is only valuable if these officials use it and use it correctly.”92  
The failure or refusal of agencies or individuals to use the National Response 
Plan and effectively share information among the coordinating mechanisms can 
ultimately result in less than optimal incident and consequence management.  
Additionally, information that is shared among agencies through the coordinating 
mechanisms of the NRP will only prove useful if that information can quickly 
reach the consumers and decision makers who need it most.  The current 
systems within the NRP do, however, provide a foundation upon which a 
desirable information-sharing environment during emergencies can be developed 
and expanded. 
The disaster response lessons learned from events like the September 11 
attacks and Hurricane Katrina have highlighted the national information-sharing 
challenges that still exist.  The nation is however, slowly beginning a paradigm 
shift to find an appropriate balance within the information-sharing environment.93  
As the National Response Plan matures, the effective implementation of its 
outlined principles will be critical.  Each stakeholder’s willingness to share critical 
information during an actual disaster, will ultimately determine if the United 
                                            
91 NRP, 24. 
92 House Homeland Security Committee. US Representative David Reichert (R-WA) Holds a 
Joint Hearing with the House Armed Services Committee, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities Subcommittee on Military/National Guard Disaster Response. Nov 9, 2005.   
93 Preliminary Report on the Creation of the Information Sharing Environment.  Jun 22, 2006, 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/intel/nps17-062206-05.pdf (accessed Sep 15, 2005), 6. 
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States moves closer to achieving its goal of improving the nation's ability to 
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VI. DOD ROLE IN DISASTER RESPONSE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Understanding the role each agency plays in U.S. domestic incident 
management is a critical first step toward achieving an effective response during 
a disaster.  The September 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
entitled, Catastrophic Disasters:  Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, emphasized the importance of 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities in disaster response.  The following 
reminder resonates loudly: 
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic 
disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of 
authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively 
communicated, and well understood in order to facilitate rapid and 
effective decision making.94  
Domestically, the role of the primary decision-making agency was clearly 
announced by HSPD-5.  It charged DHS with the responsibility for coordinating 
Federal U.S. resources “to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist 
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.”95  One of the key U.S. 
resources used to help accomplish this task, particularly when responding to 
catastrophic disasters, is the Department of Defense (DOD).   
When local, state and federal agencies have exhausted their resources, 
the armed forces have historically played an important supporting role in 
providing domestic assistance during emergencies.  Defining the roles and 
understanding the responsibilities outlined for the Department of Defense within 
the National Response Plan is an important first step toward an effectively 
coordinated Federal domestic incident response.   
                                            
94 Government Accountability Office. Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, 
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. Washington, D.C, Sep 2006, first page of 
document; Highlights section. 
95 Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, 7. 
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The May 2006 Notice of Change to the National Response Plan, noted the 
increased importance of DOD to disaster response by emphasizing that “DOD 
has significant resources that may be available to support the Federal response 
to an actual or potential incident.”96  This statement begs an important question:  
when DOD assistance is needed, what mechanism allows the DOD to commit 
resources to support a Federal response to terrorist attacks, major disasters or 
other emergencies?  The answer: Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).   
B. DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA) 
Within the National Response Plan, DSCA is defined as DOD support 
provided by Federal military forces, DOD agencies and components, DOD 
civilians and contract personnel in response to requests for assistance during 
domestic incidents.97  Specific requests are usually received from a civilian 
primary or lead agency whenever resources at the local, State, or Federal level 
are deemed to be overwhelmed or incapable of effectively responding to an 
incident or natural disaster.98  The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) authorizes 
DSCA for domestic incidents as directed by the President or “when appropriate 
under the circumstances and applicable laws.”99  DOD resources are typically 
provided for DSCA when it does not interfere with military readiness or 
operations.100   
Military service capabilities normally used for war fighting and combat 
operations can often be utilized to assist civilian agencies during domestic 
events, emergencies or consequence management following a disaster.  During 
his October 27, 2005 statement before the House Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Admiral 
Timothy J. Keating, Commander, United States Northern Command, confirmed 
                                            
96 Notice of Change to the National Response Plan, 10. 
97 Quick Reference Guide for the National Response Plan, 19. 
98 NRP, 42. 
99 Ibid, 10. 
100 Ibid, 42. 
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that many of the DOD’s “specialized skills and assets”101 can help to “rapidly 
stabilize and improve the situation.”102  The NRP also acknowledges that “DOD 
has significant resources that may be available to support the Federal response 
to an Incident of National Significance.”103  Accordingly, “the NRP identifies DOD 
as a supporting agency to the lead agency in all 15 of the NRP’s Emergency 
Support Functions.104  As such, the DOD, through DSCA, may be called upon to 
provide a wide variety of valuable support to civil authorities and emergency 
responders at the local and State level. 
1. Request for Assistance (RFA) Process 
When civil authorities require DOD support for the preparation, response 
or recovery of a domestic incident or event, they must submit a request that goes 
through a prescribed set of procedures.  These procedures are part of the 
Request for Assistance process, commonly referred to as the RFA process.  
Figure 3 gives a pictorial overview of the complete RFA process.  The figure 
clearly indicates that “DOD is not the lead” federal agency for RFA and outlines 
specific tasks and functions performed once a request is received from the Lead 
Federal Agency (LFA).105 
Generally, FEMA would be the LFA during a domestic disaster.  If DOD 
assistance is required, a request would be submitted through the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and validated by the ASD (HD), Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense.  The ASD (HD) then evaluates the suitability of 
the request according to the following criteria: legality, lethality, risk, cost, 
readiness and appropriateness.106  Simultaneously, the request is forwarded to 
                                            
101 U.S.Congress, House of Representatives. Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Hearing on the Military’s Role, October 27, 
2006: “Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast 
Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama,” Oct 2005. 
102 Ibid. 
103 NRP, 10 
104 Senate Report, 26-3. Also see Table 1 for a list of DOD’s support role under the 15 ESFs  
105 See Figure 3 for details. 
106 See Figure 3 for details. 
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the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) while awaiting approval of the 
submitted request.  Once approval is granted, the JDOMS issues orders to the 
appropriate service, agency or Combatant Commander to carry out assistance to 
the civil authorities that requested assistance.107  Joint Publication 3-26, 
Homeland Security, August 2, 2005, issues an important reminder for all entities 
involved in DSCA: “any requests for DOD assistance should be processed in 
accordance with the NRP.”108 
After a request is initiated through the RFA process, all DOD support 
provided for a response effort remains subordinate to civilian control.  The civilian 
LFA, which usually falls under DHS, assumes control of the domestic response 
effort and uses the NRP as a basis for their actions.   For example, according to 
the NRP, a state Governor “requests Federal assistance when it becomes clear 
that State or tribal capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or 
exhausted.”109  In this case, if the Federal assistance required is from DOD, the 
Secretary of DHS (senior civilian LFA when not delegated) would assume 
ultimate responsibility for submitting an RFA through the system to the SecDef 
for approval.  Upon approval to provide DSCA, the specific request would be 
processed as orders through JDOMS, as described above, and passed to the 
appropriate Combatant Commander(s).110  In North America, Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM)111 would typically receive orders to assist.  Once 
military forces are tasked to provide DSCA, the Secretary of Defense retains 
command of the forces as in other military situations and operations.112   
                                            
107 Ibid. 
108 JP 3-26, Homeland Security, August 2, 2005, IV-11.   
109 NRP, 41 
110 See figure X for the routing of request to orders. 
111 “NORTHCOM is based in Colorado Springs, Colorado and is responsible for conducting 
military operations in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, certain Caribbean islands, and in 
the sea and air approaches to the United States.”  Taken from Senate Report, 26-9. 
112 NRP, 4. 
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In the NRP, the concept of “command” and “unity of command” is 
specifically noted as having a distinct cultural and legal meaning for military 
forces that differs from civil authorities.113  As such, the plan implicitly states that: 
“nothing in this plan impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the Secretary of 
Defense over the DOD, including the chain of command for military forces from 
the President as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the 
commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures.”114  
In short, for active-duty military forces, the chain of command remains 
unchanged while providing support to civil authorities. 
2. Command and Control  
Command and control for DSCA largely depends on the magnitude, type 
of incident and level of resource involvement that would be required during a 
disaster.115  As mentioned in the scenario above and described in Figure 3, once 
initial RFAs are routed to the SecDef and receive approval, DOD designates a 
supported combatant commander to execute the response.   
For DSCA, “CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM are the supported 
combatant commanders within their AORs for mission execution.”116  When the 
time comes to put “boots on the ground,” the commander typically directs a 
senior military officer to deploy to the incident site.  Under most circumstances, 
the senior military officer at the incident site becomes the Defense Coordinating 
Officer (DCO)—“DOD’s single point of contact in the Joint Field Office (JFO)”.117 
The supported DOD combatant commander may also utilize a Joint Task 
Force (JTF) to command Title 10 federal military activities in support of an 
incident.118  If a JTF is established, the command and control element will be 
collocated with the Principle Federal Official (PFO) at the JFO.   
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116 JP 3-26, Homeland Security, IV-11. 
117 NRP, 42. 
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The PFO functions as the representative for the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and is usually delegated as the lead Federal official.119  This person 
also serves as primary point of contact for “Federal interface with State, local, 
and tribal senior elected/appointed officials, the media, and the private 
sector.”120  Additionally, they ensure effective communication and information-
sharing among the coordinating mechanisms within the NRP. 
The JTF Commander is responsible for maintaining “operational control 
for all allotted DOD resources.”121  This is “consistent with operational 
requirements and ensures there is unity of effort and coordination” 122 among the 
DOD tasked units and civilian agencies. 
3. Coordination and Unity of Command 
For DSCA, the concepts of both coordination and unity of effort have 
become increasingly important.  The previously cited GAO report on catastrophic 
disasters concluded that, “DOD is likely to contribute substantial support to state 
and local authorities, including search and rescue assets, evacuation assistance, 
provision of supplies, damage assessment assets, and possibly helping to 
ensure public safety.”123  If GAO’s observation of the DOD contributing 
“substantial support” to future disasters is correct, then the NRP was right on 
target when it stressed that “continuous coordination with Federal, State, local, 
and tribal elements before, during, and after an event is essential for efficient and 
effective utilization of DOD’s DSCA efforts.”124   
The successful implementation of DSCA during an emergency or incident 
largely depends on the proper execution of both concepts.  Clearly, the 
organizational leadership positions discussed above and outlined in the NRP are 
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aimed at providing command and control during emergencies.  Properly 
executed, each position will also play a vital role in obtaining and maintaining 
unity of command and effective coordination during response to a domestic 
incident or disaster. 
4. Legal Limitations 
The ability to effectively utilize DOD resources in support of civil 
authorities during domestic emergencies also requires knowledge of the existing 
legal limitations to DSCA.  Three applicable laws will briefly be examined: the 
Posse Comitatus Act; Insurrection Act; and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act.   
a. Posse Comitatus Act  
The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) was a law originally passed in 
1878 by both political parties to ensure that Executive, State or local officials 
could not call up military forces whenever they required a “posse” to settle 
disputes over labor, race or politics, etc.125  The Act has largely remained 
unchanged, and generally prohibits the use of military forces to perform domestic 
law enforcement or enforce civil law, except as specifically authorized by the 
Constitution or congressional statute.  In short, the Posse Comitatus Act ensures 
the military is not improperly used to perform as a civilian police force.126 
The primary limitation of the PCA is against “direct involvement in 
traditional law enforcement activities by active duty military personnel (including 
Reservists on active duty and National Guard personnel in Federal service),”127 
including Federal civilians.  This Act applies to the U.S. Army and Air Force.  
Similar constraints, however, have also been placed upon Navy and Marine Corp 
forces through DOD policy.128  Although the PCA doesn’t specifically mention 
the Coast Guard, Charles Doyle, American public law specialist with the 
                                            
125 Posse Comitatus Act. Pub. L. 97-86, Dec 1, 1981; 95 Stat. 1114; 10 U.S.C. (sections) 
371-378. 
126 CRS Report for Congress 95-964, 37. 
127 NRP, 80. 
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Congressional Research Service, noted that for all practical purposes, “the Coast 
Guard is statutorily authorized to perform law enforcement functions.”129  Thus, 
Congress “has vested the Coast Guard, a branch of the armed forces, with broad 
law enforcement responsibilities.”130 
A violation of the PCA generally occurs “(a) when the armed forces 
perform tasks which are assigned not to them but to an organ of civil 
government, or (b) when the armed forces perform tasks assigned to them solely 
for purposes of civilian government.”131  Additionally, U.S. courts have held that 
PCA is also violated during the following: 
(1) when civilian law enforcement officials make “direct active use” of 
military investigators; or (2) when the use of the military “pervades the 
activities” of the civilian officials; or (3) when the military is used so as 
to subject citizens to the exercise of military power that is “regulatory, 
prescriptive, or compulsory in nature.”132 
 
To date, there have apparently been no prosecutions for violations 
of the PCA, a “criminal statute.”133  Compliance is largely due to the military’s 
own self restraint and practice of avoiding situations that could possibly constitute 
a violation of the law.134  When Congress provides statutory exceptions by 
“vesting law enforcement authority either directly in a military branch (e.g., the 
Coast Guard) or indirectly by authorizing the President or another government 
agency to call for assistance in enforcing certain laws,” 135 there is no violation of 
the PCA.  One such exception to the PCA falls under the Insurrection 
Statutes.136 
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b. Insurrection Act 
Although the SecDef may authorize DSCA when appropriate, State 
and local governments have “primary responsibility for protecting life and 
property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community.”137  The 
Insurrection Act, however, focuses on the President’s ability to perform this 
function with military troops when he deems it is in the best interest of the United 
States.  As such, the Insurrection Statutes “authorize the President to direct 
armed forces to enforce the law to suppress insurrections (i.e. riots) and 
domestic violence,”138 or other civil disturbances.  Additionally, military forces 
may engage in law enforcement activities to restore order and prevent looting or 
other illegal activity.139 
The authority given Congress in the first article of the Constitution is 
delegated to the President, authorizing him “to use the armed forces as he 
considers necessary to enforce the law or to suppress the rebellion...if law 
enforcement is hindered within a state, and local law enforcement is unable to 
protect individuals.”140  A request for assistance or permission from the affected 
state governor is not needed for the President to act—only a determination that 
the unlawful action is interfering with the state’s ability to execute laws and 
provide justice within those laws.141 
The Insurrection Act has been used several times throughout U.S. 
history.  Two of the most recent uses of the armed forces to maintain law and 
order occurred during the 1992 Los Angeles riots and looting in the Virgin Islands 
during Hurricane Hugo in 1989.142  During these types of civil disturbances or 
when use of the armed forces under the Insurrection Act is appropriate, the 
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President “must first issue a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse 
within a limited time.”143  Failure to comply with the President’s order may then 
result in “an executive order to send in troops.”144 
In addition to use during insurrections and civil disturbances, 
military troops may also be called upon to assist civil authorities during domestic 
disaster relief.  The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act give the provisions and limitations for use of armed forces during such 
incidents. 
c. Stafford Act 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (Stafford Act) “establishes programs and processes for the Federal 
Government to provide disaster and emergency assistance to States, local 
governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit 
organizations.”145  All hazards, from natural disasters to terrorist events are 
covered in the provisions, as well as instructions for State Governors to request 
federal emergency disaster assistance.146 
The Stafford Act basically allows the President to “make a wide 
range of federal aid available to states that are stricken by a natural or man-
made disaster.”147  This aid can come from multiple sources and may be in the 
form of critical goods and services, financial or technical assistance.148  A major 
disaster or emergency declaration may be given by the President when the 
combined local and State response capacities are exceeded and a joint Federal, 
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State and local preliminary damage assessment (PDA) finds that assistance 
under the Stafford Act is warranted.149 
This Act allows the President to “unilaterally direct the provision of 
emergency assistance”150in an affected area which “the Federal Government 
exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority.”151  Advance 
deployment of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), DHS and FEMA 
representatives and equipment is also authorized under the Act to expedite 
assistance and “reduce immediate threats to life, property, and public health and 
safety.”152  Additionally, the Stafford Act is the legal mechanism that allows 
presidential appointment and DHS Under Secretary of EPR designation of an 
FCO to coordinate Federal disaster assistance.153  All Stafford Act authorities 
granted to the DHS Secretary have been delegated to the Under Secretary of 
EPR. 
An emergency declaration under the Stafford Act requires the 
affected state governor to provide a “detailed definition of the type and amount of 
federal aid required.”154  They must also “implement the state’s emergency 
response plan, for example, by activating the state’s National Guard units under 
state control…and provide information regarding the resources that have been 
committed.155 
For a major disaster declaration, “the governor need not specify 
which forms of assistance are needed.”156  However, the resources committed 
must still be disclosed and emergency response plans implemented.  The 
                                            
149 NRP, 79. 








governor must also “certify that the state will comply with cost sharing provisions 
under the Stafford Act.”157 
One important point to highlight is the fact that according the NRP, 
“all Presidentially declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act are 
considered Incidents of National Significance.”158  This means the DHS 
Secretary does not need to declare an event an INS as outlined in the NRP if the 
President has already made an emergency or major disaster declaration. 
Immediately following a domestic emergency that would likely 
qualify for Stafford Act assistance, the Governor of the affected State may 
request that the President direct the SecDef to utilize DOD personnel, 
equipment, technology, etc., to perform emergency work “that is essential for the 
preservation of life and property.”159  Unlike the PCA, “the Stafford Act does not 
authorize the use of federal military forces to maintain law and order.”160  If a 
state governor keeps National Guard troops under their control, then those forces 
may engage in law enforcement activities.  Once the Guard is federalized for an 
emergency or major disaster, they fall under the same rules as active duty troops 
and “their role is restricted to the disaster relief operations authorized under the 
Stafford Act.”161 
If the President concurs with the Governor’s request for assistance 
under the Stafford Act, DOD resources can be directed to perform emergency 
work for a maximum of 10 days before a major disaster declaration is issued by 
the President.162  The following operations may be performed by U.S. armed 
forces: 
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• Debris removal 
• Road clearance 
• Search and rescue 
• Emergency medical care and shelter 
• Provision of food, water and other essential needs 
• Dissemination of public information  
• Assistance regarding health and safety measures 
• Provision of technical advice to state and local governments on 
disaster management and control.163 
 
DOD forces may also be called upon to assist civil authorities 
during a variety of emergency situations.  A general knowledge of all three 
statutes discussed above is helpful in understanding the legal limitations that 
exist for use of DOD resources during emergencies or major disasters.  DOD 
forces can play an invaluable support role in civil emergency management, as 
long as their use is understood and complies with all legal statutes. 
5. Permissible Support Under DSCA 
It is common for DOD to provide extensive lifesaving and sustaining 
support through DSCA; however, they also provide smaller scale support for 
incidents such as wild fires, earthquakes or floods.164  In addition to DSCA for 
incident response, DOD may be tasked to employ specialized capabilities in 
support of Federal, State, local, and tribal government agencies.  This includes 
areas such as medical services, test and evaluation facilities and capabilities, 
and explosive detection expertise.  The DOD Homeland Defense Coordination 
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Office facilitates the interdepartmental cooperation and transfer of valuable DOD 
skills and capabilities to the emergency responder community.165 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Overall, the National Response Plan provides solid coverage of DOD’s 
role in disaster response through Defense Support of Civil Authorities.  The 
details, however, on the specific responsibilities and expected support for various 
disaster scenarios are lacking.  Additionally, there are very few references to the 
capabilities that DOD can bring to bear for domestic incident management. 
A general description of available capabilities at the unclassified level 
could prove useful to both civil authorities and military planners by providing 
advance visibility to the type of support the DOD could reasonably provide.  The 
information could also be used to assist local and state leadership when they 
prepare requests for assistance.  Knowledge of the general capabilities DOD 
offers can not only expedite the flow of RFAs, but streamline the process by 
reducing inappropriate or unrealistic requests from civil authorities due to 
ignorance of DOD capabilities.   
DOD should engage authorities within DHS before the next revision of the 
NRP to discuss any additions to the plan in terms of capabilities or 
responsibilities.  This dialogue could also help ensure the timely resolution of any 
critical disaster response issues involving the DOD that need to be addressed in 
the NRP.  Primary and support agencies or other stakeholders should also be 
included in the coordination of any proposed modifications to the NRP. 
As of this report, the basic script of the NRP has been written and 
updated.  The actors have been cast and the general roles and responsibilities 
defined.  Nevertheless, success or failure of the disaster scene ultimately lies 
with the actors and the strength of the script.  The nation’s hope for effective 
domestic incident management will rely heavily on each actor’s ability to clearly 
understand and effectively perform their roles as written in the script. 
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When a disaster does occur and the scene is complete, audiences at all 
levels throughout the nation can only hope the actors’ performances and the 
current script are sufficient enough for seamless, coordinated and efficient 
emergency response to an incident.  The next domestic disaster will be the litmus 
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VII. HURRICANE KATRINA FEDERAL RESPONSE 
A. OVERVIEW 
One unforgettable disaster where emergency response at the local, state 
and federal level was recently judged by the nation was Hurricane Katrina.  In 
August of 2005, this Category 3 hurricane166 pummeled the gulf coast, wreaking 
havoc and widespread destruction in its path.  The storm became one of the 
largest disasters in United States history.167  In the immediate aftermath of the 
storm, the federal government was criticized for a slow, less-than-effective 
response to the overwhelmed local and state agencies along the gulf coast. 
This chapter will examine the timeline for the U.S. active duty military 
(DOD) and FEMA/Coast Guard (DHS) response during Hurricane Katrina.  
Based on that timeline, it will also evaluate whether the actual response to the 
disaster was implemented according to the National Response Plan.  This will 
provide foundational knowledge to understanding the concerns and issues with 
the federal government’s general response to Hurricane Katrina.  Finally, the 
chapter will also evaluate if greater DOD authority is needed during future major 
domestic disasters,  
B. TIMELINE OF STORM WARNINGS 
When considering a timeline for the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, 
it is useful to look at the warnings received prior to the storm making landfall.  
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) analysis and 
tracking of the storm was comprehensive, detailed and communicated widely 
through multiple media sources.  The NOAA Satellite and Information Service 
                                            
166 Hurricane Katrina was originally thought to be a Category 4 or 5 strength hurricane when 
it made landfall.  However the NHC later announced that sustained winds only reached 125 mph 
at landfall; making it a Category 3 storm.  Prior to landfall, Katrina did reach Category 5 strength.  
See the NOAA website for details at 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html.  Also see Figure 4 for scale and 
Figure 5 for storm path and intensity. 
167 Henry B. Hogue and Keith Bea. CRS Report for Congress, Federal Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security Organization: Historical Developments and Legislative 
Options, Jun 1, 2006, 1. 
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website was one source that consistently posted updates and warnings of the 
potential track and pending effects of the storm.  Forecast advisories and public 
advisories were posted daily and constantly updated. 
The storm initially developed on August 23, 2005 as a Tropical Depression 
in the southeastern Bahamas.168  On August 24, 2005, the site showed how 
Tropical Depression 12 evolved into a Tropical Storm that was given the eleventh 
name of the 2005 hurricane season: Katrina.169  As Tropical Storm Katrina 
moved closer to the United States, its intensity rapidly increased, prompting a 
hurricane watch followed by a warning for southeast Florida.  As the storm 
crossed over the tip of Florida with wind gusts and heavy rains on August 25, 
Tropical Storm Katrina become a Category 1 hurricane.170  “Although the storm 
over Florida never had sustained winds higher than 80 mph, substantial damage 
and flooding occurred and fourteen people lost their lives.”171  
Hurricane Katrina strengthened as it moved into the warm waters of the 
Gulf of Mexico on Saturday, August 27, 2005.172  The National Hurricane Center 
(NHC) issued another hurricane watch for parts of Louisiana and a hurricane 
warning for the north central Gulf Coast.173  In fact, the director of the NHC, Max 
Mayfield, took the initiative to call “officials in Alabama, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi to warn them of the severity of the coming storm.”174 
While in the Gulf of Mexico, Katrina grew to a massive storm that 
generated hurricane force winds up to 105 miles out and tropical storm force 
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winds 230 miles out.175  The sheer size and intensity of Hurricane Katrina at its 
peak strength prompted the NHC to again issue a warning.  This time the 
warning was for storm surge flooding that could reach 18 to 22 feet above the 
normal tide.  “By 07:00 CDT on Sunday, August 28, Hurricane Katrina reached 
Category 5 status with wind speeds of 160 mph and a pressure of 908 
millibars.”176  Moreover, the NHC warned that, “some levees in the Greater New 
Orleans Area could be overtopped.”177 
Early Monday morning, August 29, 2005, at 06:00 CDT, a NOAA buoy 50 
miles east of the mouth of the Mississippi River measured a gigantic 55-foot 
wave, “the highest ever measured by a National Data Buoy Center (NDBC) 
buoy.”178  Ten minutes later, at 06:10 CDT, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a 
“strong Category 3 storm”179 in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana.180  The result 
was massive devastation: over 2.5 million customers without power in three 
states, unusable hospitals and other key infrastructure such as cell phone, 
television and radio towers, approximately 80% flooding for the city of New 
Orleans and multiple breaches in the 350-mile levee system.181 
Multiple warnings on Hurricane Katrina’s deadly potential were given well 
in advance of the storm making landfall.  In light of the warnings, many local, 
State and Federal emergency managers, first responders and disaster response 
agencies began preparing for what was rumored to be the “big one.” 
 
                                            




179 A Category 3 hurricane can produce winds from 111-130 mph with a storm surge from 9-
12 ft above normal. The following damage can be expected: structural damage to small 
residences, damage to foliage, destruction of mobile homes and flooding near the coast and 
inland 8 miles or more for areas less than five feet above sea level. Information taken from 
National Weather Service website, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml, (accessed May 
2006). 
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C. DOD RESPONSE TIMELINE 
Friday, August 19, 2005—Wednesday, September 7, 2005 
The DOD was one of the federal agencies that made advanced 
preparations for Hurricane Katrina.  On August 19, 2005, two weeks prior to 
landfall, DOD heeded the advanced warnings for the 2005 hurricane season.  
“Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, signed a severe weather execution 
order that gave Northern Command some authority to respond to potential 
severe weather incidents on its own initiative.”182  This unprecedented action 
gave the NORTHCOM commander the ability to deploy DOD assets quicker than 
in previous years without the requirement for specific SecDef notification. 
Preparations for the storm began with identification of military installations 
as staging bases, coordination with FEMA representatives and DOD 
components, deployment alerts to military units and early assessment of 
resources necessary for response.183  The SecDef’s order sealed DOD 
involvement and set the stage for the key role it would play in the federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina. 
On August 23, the week prior to the storm’s landfall on August 29, 
“USNORTHCOM began tracking the tropical depression that became Hurricane 
Katrina.”184  Standard hurricane assessments for MREs, emergency medical 
capabilities and FEMA staging bases were accomplished by the ASD (HD) 
Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support.  This was performed primarily on 
individual initiative without formal DOD guidance.185 
As the Tropical Depression evolved into Tropical Storm Katrina on 
Wednesday, August 24, 2005, NORTHCOM “issued its first warning orders to 
Regional Emergency Preparedness Officers, State Emergency Preparedness 
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Officers, and the Senior Army Advisors (Guard) in the states expected to be 
affected.”186  NORTHCOM began daily teleconferences with FEMA and other 
DOD joint supporting commands.  The Army, Navy and Air Force were directed 
to prepare for disaster relief operations, deployments and requests for DOD 
assets.  As a result, First U.S. Army issued its own Warning Order followed by a 
Planning Order the following day.  The DCO and staff were deployed to Florida 
with deployments to Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi on the horizon.187 
States of emergency declarations for Louisiana and Mississippi were 
made by each state’s governor on August 26 and 27 respectively.  DCOs for both 
states were deployed to manage coordination efforts with state and federal 
officials on August 27.188  NORTHCOM also deployed forward elements to set-
up Joint Task Force-Katrina (JTF-Katrina).  U.S. Transportation Command 
alerted C-5 and C-17 heavy transport aircraft and two Contingency Response 
Wings as standard advanced hurricane planning.189 
As of Sunday, August 27, the Lead Federal Agency (FEMA, under DHS), 
had not requested assistance from the DOD. 190  Frustrated by the lack of 
requests for support and “due to the magnitude of Katrina,”191  The DOD 
continued to lean forward by deploying personnel and assets prior to a 
Presidential emergency declaration.  The USS Bataan was the most significant 
DOD deployment prior to Katrina’s landfall.  The Navy ship’s engagement in 
response activities, however, had to wait until proper request and authorization 
was received.192 
Although DOD was eager to assist, state sovereignty became an issue 
during response.  “Florida, Alabama and Mississippi declined active duty military 
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assistance”193  Additionally, the Louisiana governor decided to keep National 
Guard troops under state control.  This issue of federalism in Louisiana may have 
contributed to a perceived slow active-duty military response.194 
Following Katrina’s landfall on Monday, August 29, the President issued a 
federal emergency declaration and the Deputy SecDef authorized deployment 
approval.  On Monday evening, JDOMS finally issued “the first official order for 
military support to the response.”195  FEMA’s request for two helicopters needed 
for operations on Tuesday, August 30 was “received by DOD on Sunday, at 5 
p.m.”196  The First Air Cavalry from Fort Hood, Texas received orders for support 
and had to quickly launch within hours to arrive on the requested date.197 
Some DHS officials complained that it took too long to gain RFA approval.  
DOD culture, JDOMS, and bureaucracy were blamed for impeding the approval 
process.198  “Top DOD officials vigorously disputed the assertion that their 
approval process slowed the arrival of DOD assets.”199  Some military officers, 
however, admitted difficulties processing requests with JDOMS. 200 
The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
also found that “JDOMS was slow in approving the initial requests for helicopter 
support in Louisiana.”201  Records showed that processing times didn’t match up 
with the scale of the disaster.  A bureaucratic process and the treatment of civil 
support as a secondary mission also slowed the DOD response.202  Although 
DHS and FEMA officials also “complained that DOD did not do enough, and was 
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slow to process requests,”203 the Senate “investigation found that, in fact, FEMA 
originated very few requests in this early period.”204 
Nevertheless, DOD leadership at the Pentagon took steps to expedite the 
ordinary approval process and improve information accuracy in the Pentagon.  
They also attempted to bolster damage assessment capabilities and eliminate 
television and media reports as primary sources of information.205   
As of Tuesday, August 30, a Principle Federal Officer (PFO) “to facilitate 
Federal domestic incident planning and coordination at the local level”206 had not 
been designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security.  In an effort to expedite 
the process, DOD’s Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense called and 
encouraged DHS to appoint a PFO in accordance with the NRP.207  DOD hoped 
the PFO would not only manage the response efforts and trigger capabilities 
under the NRP, but ensure DOD maintained a supporting role under civilian 
leadership.  DHS Secretary appointed Director of FEMA, Mike Brown, as PFO by 
the end of the day.208  This appointment was welcomed, but surprised many 
because the NRP specifically states that the PFO is not typically “dual-hatted” 
with other responsibilities that could detract from incident management of the 
disaster.209 
In the meantime, anticipation of a large rescue and recovery role 
prompted the DOD to officially activate JTF-Katrina.210  The organization 
commanded all Title 10 assets and “grew to include 24,500 active duty forces, 
over 200 fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and 20 ships at its peak.”211 
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Overall, the DOD remained frustrated, surprised and concerned with the 
lack of RFAs from FEMA.  Although NORTHCOM continued to lack damage 
assessment information and did not know the types of support that FEMA 
needed, they were eager to provide assistance.  In some cases, the DOD even 
drafted RFAs and sent them to FEMA to copy and return to DOD as formal 
requests. 212   
Also on August 30, Admiral Keating, NORTHCOM Commander, received 
a “black check” request from Admiral Giambastiani, Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, to send “whatever you can think of…”213  to the disaster area. 
Gen Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also instructed his service 
chiefs to “pre-position resources in anticipation of a request for assistance from 
FEMA.”214  Although “a command of this magnitude is extremely rare in 
DOD,”215 it ensured potentially useful DOD resources were staged closer to the 
disaster areas and ready to respond when requests were received and approved. 
On Wednesday, August 31, Governor Blanco told President Bush, FEMA 
Director and Louisiana FCO that she did not want federalization of the National 
Guard Troops under her command.  Additionally, she asked Lt. Gen. Honore’, 
JTF-Katrina Commander, to coordinate the New Orleans evacuation.  She also 
requested federal active-duty troops from NORTHCOM.216 
Thursday evening, September 1, DOD received a request to airlift 
evacuees from New Orleans to Houston, Texas.  Although the Joint Staff 
processed the request on Friday, September 2, the first evacuation mission 
actually left New Orleans on Thursday morning, providing evidence of the 
overwhelming DOD efforts to lean forward and avoid delays in processing 
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requests for assistance.217  DOD also delivered food and water that arrived in 
Gulfport, Mississippi on September 1.218 
On Saturday, September 3, the President issued a broad deployment 
order for “7,200 active-duty forces from the 82nd Airborne, 1st Cavalry and II 
Marine Expeditionary Force. 219.  The active-duty forces were commanded by Lt. 
Gen. Honore’ and the Guard forces stayed under Governor Blanco and Maj. 
Gen. Landreneau’s command.220   
Between Saturday, September 3 and Monday, September 5, 2005, DOD 
received seven additional RFAs totaling approximately $805 million. The drafting 
and refinement of the requests where accomplished by DHS and DOD 
officials.221  This included a request approved by the SecDef for DOD to take 
over FEMA’s logistics functions.222  After a thorough examination of FEMA’s 
supply chain, the “DOD developed a plan for how DOD would run operations at 
those staging areas traditionally run by FEMA.”223  In the end, federal active duty 
troops did not need to assume operations from FEMA.  Instead, they “simply 
retooled the way FEMA procured and transported commodities.”224 
Throughout the DOD response to Katrina, several active-duty forces and 
assets were used for various life-sustaining support and search and rescue 
operations.  The USS Bataan’s helicopters were “the first active-duty aircraft to 
assist with search and rescue.”225  Various other military members and assets 
also supported the disaster relief along the Gulf Coast.  Navy assets included the 
USS Iwo Jima, USS Truman, USS Shreveport, USS Tortuga, USNS Arctic and 
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USNS Comfort.226  Soldiers from 82nd Airborne and 1st Cavalry Divisions, 
Marines from Camps Pendleton and Lejeune as well as Air Force C-130 Aircraft 
were all involved in the response efforts.227   
By September 6, 2005, “almost 60,000 U.S. service members were aiding 
in rescue and recovery efforts in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida.228  
Even the Ready Reserve Fleet was given blanket approval by the SecDef to 
support the disaster recovery efforts.  Maritime academy training ships also 
“provided housing and support for port workers and petroleum industry 
workers.”229  In fact, when Vice Admiral Allen took over as PFO, he led JFT-
Katrina aboard the USS Iwo Jima.230 
Although disaster relief is a secondary to the DOD’s primary national 
defense mission, as of September 7, 2005, “about 45,000 National Guardsmen 
and 18,000 active-duty troops were involved, working in partnership with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency and other federal entities”231 during 
the response to Hurricane Katrina. 
D. DHS RESPONSE TIMELINE 
Beginning on July 13, 1994, 13 months before Katrina struck the Gulf 
Coast, FEMA conducted Hurricane Pam, “an exercise to assess the results of a 
theoretical Category 3 hurricane” in the city of New Orleans, Louisiana.232  
During the exercise, “270 officials from all levels of government did participate in 
a FEMA-funded, weeklong simulation of a Category 3 Hurricane striking New 
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Orleans, …based on extensive computer models developed at Louisiana State 
University.”233 
The primary assumptions for the Hurricane Pam exercise was that a 
Category 3 or higher storm would topple New Orleans levees systems, leaving 
toxic water and 30 cubic yards of debris over 13 parishes.  It also assumed up to 
500,000 residents who did not evacuate would be stranded in the city.234  
According to the Senate investigation report on Katrina, based on this 1994 
exercise, local, state and federal officials knew that large numbers of people 
lacked means to evacuate themselves, but failed to address the problem.235 
Friday, August 19, 2005—Monday, September 5, 2005 
Fast-forwarding to August 25, 2005, the “Gulf Coast States and localities 
began hurricane preparations…even as the storm approached its first landfall in 
Florida.”236  FEMA prepared for Florida and other potential Gulf Coast landfalls 
by pre-staging more than 400 trucks of ice, 500 trucks of water and almost 200 
trucks of food throughout logistics centers in five states:  Alabama, Louisiana, 
Georgia, South Carolina and Texas. They also delivered 100 truckloads of ice, 
35 truckloads of food and 70 truckloads of water to areas in Georgia.237 
Before Katrina made its second landfall, the pre-staging efforts by FEMA 
constituted the “largest pre-positioning of Federal assets in history.”238  During 
this time, FEMA began conducting daily video teleconferences at noon from their 
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) to “help synchronize Federal, 
State and local responders,”239 exchange information and reconcile response 
activities among the various disaster support agencies and FEMA regions.  They 
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also “placed Rapid Needs Assessment and Emergency Response Teams – 
Advance Elements on alert.”240 
From August 26 through 28, states of emergencies were declared for 
Louisiana and Mississippi and warnings were given to Gulf Coast residents in the 
form of televised appearances by FEMA Director, Mike Brown, Louisiana 
Governor, Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor, Ray Nagin.  Hurricane 
warnings and watches from the NHC were also provided as the storm intensified 
into a category 3 hurricane.241  The region VI Regional Response Coordination 
Center (RRCC) and all NRP ESFs, except number 13 were activated.  The 
FEMA-State Liaison was also activated and deployed to the Louisiana 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC), while Barksdale AFB, Louisiana was 
activated as a Mobilization Center and FEMA emergency teams deployed to 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.242   
In addition to the pre-staging of critical supplies (water, ice, MREs and 
tarps) at Camp Beauregard in Rapides Parish, federal Disaster Mortuary 
Operational Response Teams (DMORTs), Disaster Medical Assistance Teams 
(DMATs), Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams and the National Disaster 
Medical System (NDMS) began meeting with key state and local officials and 
assisting shelter occupants at the Superdome.243 
On Sunday morning, August 28, the Coast Guard worked to close ports 
and waterways potentially in the hurricane’s path and pre-staged personnel, 
vessels and aircraft for the storm’s aftermath.  Additionally, the Superdome was 
opened as a shelter, Mayor Nagin issued a mandatory evacuation order for New 
Orleans and the Director of FEMA arrived in Baton Rouge.244   
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During the White House investigation into the federal response to 
Hurricane Katrina, they found that “State and local officials did not use the 
Emergency Alert System (EAS) in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama.” Although 
most residents in the affected areas did evacuate, “tens of thousands, many of 
them the region’s most vulnerable, remained in areas most threatened by the 
approaching hurricane.”245 
Early Monday morning, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall 
in Louisiana as a Category 3 hurricane.246  Violent waves, massive storm surge, 
powerful winds and subsequent flooding “destroyed communities and 
infrastructure along the Gulf Coast.”247  By mid-afternoon on August 29, New 
Orleans received devastating news when “the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) notified DHS of a reported levee overtopping in St. Bernard’s 
Parish…the West Bank, and a small breach in Orleans Parish.”248 
According to the White House lessons learned report, since much of the 
communications infrastructure was disabled by the storm,  
local, State, and Federal officials were forces to depend on a variety of 
conflicting reports from a combination of media, government and 
private sources, many of which continued to provide incomplete info 
throughout the day, further clouding the understanding of what was 
occurring in New Orleans.249 
This proved particularly problematic for DHS, especially FEMA, since the lack of 
accurate information contributed to dismal situation awareness that hampered 
their ability to effectively execute their missions under the NRP.  The result was a 
slowed RFA process and difficulty articulating the specific resources needed from 
other federal agencies, especially the DOD.  In fact, the lack of accurate 
information caused disagreement on the timeline of canal breaches and 
overtopping of levees.  This was still being debated at the time the White House 
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Lessons Learned Report was released.250  As a result, the White House Report 
made the following recommendation:  “Establish a National Operations Center 
(NOC) to coordinate the National response and provide situational awareness 
and a common operating picture for the entire Federal government.”251  As of 
this report, the NOC has been created as a new coordinating mechanism within 
the NRP.  It links the former HSOC and key headquarters components as 
discussed in Chapter V.252 
Immediately after Katrina made landfall on August 29, the first response 
priority was search and rescue.253  “Within hours of the storm’s passing, the 
Coast Guard surged 30 cutters, 38 helicopters and over 5,000 personnel into the 
affected area, saving 26,055 lives in the first five days alone.”254  This is despite 
complete devastation of the communications infrastructure in most areas. 
The day Katina hit, a Coast Guard C-130 arrived in New Orleans to 
provide food, water and communications assistance.255  However, even with this 
platform, the lack of air traffic control for the first three days after the storm forced 
pilots to rely on internal standardization and training to communicate and 
maintain air space.256 
According to Coast Guard Rear Admiral Sirois, Assistant Commandant for 
Operations, the Coast Guard has unique abilities to quickly respond to disaster 
areas and successfully conduct search and rescue missions.257  This is possible 
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due to the Coast Guard’s flexible forces and decentralized command and control 
structure that “avoids delays caused by time-consuming bureaucratic 
processes.”258  Rear Admiral Sirois went on to explain that “perhaps the most 
important factor contributing to the Coast Guard’s effectiveness in disaster 
response is the fact that our forces are engaged in this type of mission on a daily 
basis.”259 
Prior to Katrina, the Coast Guard actively worked to implement the NRP, 
training thousands of personnel on NIMS and updating their contingency plans to 
reflect the NRP’s guiding principles.260  Also important to note is that “Coast 
Guard commanders can be supported or supporting commanders for military 
operations,”261 allowing them to easily integrate with DOD forces.  Though the 
Coast Guard’s extraordinary performance saved many lives, the House Report, A 
Failure of Initiative, found that their communication with other responders could 
be improved for future disasters.262 
On August 30, a FEMA Emergency Response Team-A arrived at the 
Superdome to establish “a presence, implementing Unified Command, and 
reaching out to all severely affected Parishes.”263  Nine trailers of water and five 
trailers of MREs were sent to the Superdome while plans to “air drop MREs to 
victims stranded on rooftops”264 were assessed. 
Throughout the response effort, DHS and FEMA displayed a consistent 
lack of preparedness in responding to Katrina.  Approximately five hours after 
Katrina hit, FEMA Director Michael Brown sent a memo to DHS requesting 1,000 
additional rescue workers within 48 hours and 2,000 within 7 days.  He also 
recommended that the workers be sent to training in Georgia or Florida before 
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proceeding to the disaster area.  Additionally, the DHS Secretary was slow to act 
in accordance with the NRP.  An INS was not declared by the Secretary until one 
day after Katina made landfall and three days after the Presidential disaster 
declarations were made; displaying unfamiliarity with his outlined responsibilities 
under the NRP.265  In reality, the Presidential disaster declaration automatically 
triggered an INS under the NRP, so the Secretary could have initiated 
implementation of the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex immediately following 
the declaration.266 
Similarly, other local, State and Federal disaster agencies began disaster 
preparation, planning and training after the storm made landfall.  On August 31, 
DMORT began “writing a catastrophic mass casualty plan for Katrina in 
Louisiana.”267  Additionally, the state of Louisiana, showing a gross lack of 
preparation, had to contract with a consultant to provide just-in-time training on 
the Incident Command System and the National Response Plan two days after 
Katrina made landfall in Louisiana.268   
DHS and FEMA’s lack of preparedness for Hurricane Katrina prompted 
the Senate report on Katrina to find that “Hurricane Katina exposed flaws in the 
structure of FEMA and DHS that are too substantial to mend.”269  As a result, the 
report listed the abolishment of FEMA and establishment of a new organization in 
its place as their first foundational recommendation.  The new organization would 
be known as the National Preparedness and Response Authority (NPRA), 
remaining under DHS as a more capable structure.270 
On September 1, ESF-13 was activated, prompting the inclusion of an FBI 
liaison in the RRCC.  FEMA logistics also set up “a 500-bed billeting with 
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showers at JFO location.”271  Additionally, communication capabilities such as 
“satellite, medium frequency, high frequency, and very high frequency voice and 
data communications”272 came on line when the Coast Guard’s Cutter 
SPENCER arrived in New Orleans to take tactical control of surface forces in the 
area.273 
From September 2 to 3, NRP functions and coordinating teams were 
established.  A Principle Federal Official cell was established in Baton Rouge for 
all states impacted by Katrina.  The appointed FCO also established Parish 
Liaison Teams for the parishes hardest hit by the storm.274  In addition, Joint 
Field Offices (JFOs) were established during this timeframe.275 
The next two days, September 4 and 5 had a myriad of activities take 
place.  The evacuees in Texas shelters had to be rerouted to other states after 
their resources were quickly exhausted.  The Amtrak train contract was put on 
hold until placement of evacuees could be determined and FEMA assisted in the 
development of an evacuation strategy for New Orleans city workers.  
Additionally, the DMORT Task Force helped formulate a human remains search 
and recovery plan and requested the State of Louisiana develop a mass burial 
plan.276  By September 5, Vice Admiral Thad Allen was appointed as Deputy 
PFO for Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and the U.S. Coast Guard had 
“rescued a total of 6,990 survivors by air operations and total of 10,950 by boat 
ops.”277 
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Reviewing FEMA’s performance during Hurricane Katrina, the DHS Office 
of Inspector General noted that “when compared to other disasters, FEMA 
provided record levels of support to Hurricane Katrina victims, states, and 
emergency responders.”278  The sheer magnitude of the storm, however, 
definitely challenged emergency disaster responders at the local, State and 
Federal levels.  The Inspector General’s report also acknowledged that “the 
integration of FEMA, all hazards preparedness, and disaster response and 
recovery capabilities within DHS requires additional attention.”279 
E. NRP IMPLEMENTION ON PAPER VS IN PRACTICE 
To evaluate whether the actual response to Hurricane Katrina was 
implemented according to the National Response Plan, two key areas will be 
considered:  the Catastrophic Incident Annex and the proactive federal response. 
The NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) outlines provisions for a 
proactive federal response to catastrophic incidents.  The annex specifies the 
following guiding principles: 
Primary mission is to save lives; protect critical infrastructure, property, 
and the environment; contain the event; and preserve national security 
 
Standard RFA procedures may be expedited or, under extreme 
circumstances, suspended in the immediate aftermath of an event of 
catastrophic magnitude 
 
Identified Federal response resources will deploy and begin necessary 
operations as required to commence life-safety activities 
 
Notification and full coordination with States will occur, but the 
coordination process must not delay or impede rapid deployment and 
use of critical resources; States are urged to notify and coordinate with 
local governments regarding a proactive Federal response.280  
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 Together, these provisions serve as an illustration of the actions federal 
agencies can take to provide necessary support to disaster areas in a minimum 
amount of time.  During a major disaster, the CIA of the NRP signals to all federal 
government agencies that they are “expected to think – and act – proactively in 
preparing for and responding to”281 a catastrophe. 
1. DOD Action 
As part of the federal response, DOD assumed a proactive stance by 
deploying assets early “due to the magnitude of Katrina.”282  Deployment 
preparations as well as alert and coordination procedures were well underway 
prior to Katrina’s landfall.  This was permissible under the SecDef’s severe 
weather execution order allowing NORTHCOM to deploy units under its own 
initiative.283  As a result, verbal deployment commands from the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also given in 
lieu of deployments “normally processed rigorously through specific written 
orders and electronic tracking systems.”284  “Many witnesses have credited 
these actions with fundamentally shifting the overall response of DOD, 
particularly at the Departmental level, into a proactive mode.”285 
In fact, DOD learned forward and deployed DCOs and staff members 
early to affected states.  These teams are not normally activated until after a 
disaster declaration is made by the President.286  They also alerted forces and 
directed them to “be prepared to move”287 when events on the ground stabilized 
and the LFA had an opportunity to determine the required assets needed.  
                                            
281 Senate Report, 7. 
282 Admiral Keating Statement, Oct 2005. 
283 CRS Report for Congress, Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response, September 19, 
2005, 5. 
284 Senate Report, 26-24 to 26-25. 
285 Senate Report, 26-25. 
286 Admiral Keating Statement, Oct 2005. 
287 Ibid. 
 66
Additionally, extensive coordination for heavy lift aircraft and military units to 
perform specialized missions such as inter-costal waterway search and rescue 
and aviation medical evacuation ensured requested assistance would arrive on 
scene as quickly as possible.288 
At the direction of the SecDef, USNORTHCOM quickly established a Joint 
Task Force (JTF-Katrina) to provide command and control of deployed assets 
and anticipate the role DOD could play to save lives and restore services.289  
The appointed JTF-Katrina commander, Lieutenant General Russ Honore’, 
“provided pivotal leadership”290 and ensured interagency coordination for 
requests made under DSCA.  All of these actions were right on target with the 
NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex and contributed to a proactive federal 
response.  Unfortunately however, “the National Guard deployment process was 
not well coordinated with the command of active-duty military forces.”291  In fact, 
this resulted in a House investigation finding that “the lack of integration of 
National Guard and active duty forces hampered the military response.”292 
The Senate Report on Hurricane Katrina also noted that DOD 
“preparations were not sufficient for a storm of Katrina’s magnitude.”293  This 
was primarily due to DOD’s need to shift from its traditional civil support posture 
under the NRP (responding to RFAs) to a more proactive, forward-looking 
approach (action without requests).  Overall, however, DOD’s preparation and 
response to the catastrophic disaster were consistent with its role as defined in 
the NRP and contributed to a proactive federal response. 
2. DHS Actions 
DHS’s Coast Guard and FEMA also prepared for Hurricane Katrina prior 
to landfall.  The Coast Guard, for example, proactively closed ports and 
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waterways and pre-positioned personnel, vessels and aircraft in staging areas.  
This enabled them to surge cutters, helicopters and over 5,000 personnel to 
affected areas within hours of the storm’s landfall.294 
FEMA also pre-positioned some personnel and assets in the Gulf Coast 
states prior to the storm’s arrival.  A FEMA-State liaison and Regional Response 
Coordination Center (RCCC) was activated 72 and 48 hours before landfall 
respectively.295  All NRP Emergency Support Functions, except #13, were also 
activated 48 hours early.296 
During the same timeframe, critical resources like water, ice, MREs and 
tarps were pre-staged near anticipated shelter areas and Barksdale AFB was 
activated as a Mobilization Center.  The day prior to Katrina’s landfall, FEMA 
emergency, regional and specialized team members arrived in Louisiana, along 
with the FEMA director, to begin preparations for what would become a major 
catastrophe.297 
The DHS Secretary, on the other hand, never invoked the NRP’s CIA, 
thus delaying a proactive federal response to Hurricane Katrina.  As stated in the 
NRP: 
Upon recognition that a catastrophic incident condition (e.g., involving 
mass casualties and/or mass evacuation) exists, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security immediately designates the event an Incident of 
National Significance and begins, potentially in advance of a formal 
Presidential disaster declaration, implementation of the NRP-CIA.298 
 
The Secretary’s implementation failure may have prevented critical 
assistance from getting to an affected area in the timely manner.  Moreover, the 
“activation of the NRP CIA could have led the federal government to respond 
more proactively rather than waiting for formal requests from overwhelmed state 
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and local officials.”299  In the case of New Orleans, pre-positioned resources 
would have helped many Katrina victims that evacuated to the Convention 
Center or Superdome.   
DHS is one of the primary organizations responsible for the NRP.  The 
multiple implementation failures on the part of the DHS leadership provide 
evidence that there was little familiarity with established roles and responsibilities 
within the plan.  As discussed in Chapter IV, an incident automatically becomes 
an Incident of National Significance when a major disaster declaration is given by 
the President under the authority of the Stafford Act.  In this case, the DHS 
Secretary should have declared Katrina an INS no later than Saturday, August 
27, 2005, immediately following the Presidential disaster declarations.300 
Additionally, a PFO was not appointed by the Secretary until Tuesday, 
August 30, 2005, a full day after Katrina made landfall.  According to the NRP, 
the PFO’s role is critical for providing seamless, coordinated integration of all 
federal response activities.301  The PFO can be utilized “during an actual or 
potential INS.”302  The delayed declaration of an INS and appointment of a PFO 
by the DHS Secretary essentially made a “proactive federal response under the 
NRP moot.”303 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
An examination of the timeline for the U.S. active duty military (DOD) and 
FEMA/Coast Guard (DHS) response to Hurricane Katrina clearly showed that 
improvements at every level are needed to achieve a more effective, coordinated 
federal disaster response.  It also showed that the failure to properly implement 
the National Response Plan is one issue that contributed to the delays in 
responding to the victims of the catastrophe. 
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In fact, the Senate Report on Katrina found that “inadequate training” and 
a “lack of familiarity with emergency-management principles and plans hampered 
the Katrina response.”304  One area of focus for improvements to the federal 
disaster response system ought to be upon the implementation process of the 
NRP.  If parts of the plan are inaccurate or confusing, then signatories to the plan 
should voice concerns to DHS and suggest changes, additions or deletions to the 
document. 
Ultimately, the concept of accountability for improving processes within the 
disaster system must become an integral part of each organization that plays a 
role in domestic incident management.  Likewise, for those organizations with a 
primary leadership role in federal disaster response, responsibility and 
accountability must be taken for implementation of the current plans in place to 
help achieve a unified federal response.  This is the minimum expectation.  
Finger pointing, “turf wars”, side-stepping and outright denial of roles and 
responsibilities within the disaster response system must be eliminated.  Failure 
to do so will only further delay necessary improvement. 
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VIII. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXPANDING MILITARY 
ROLE IN DISASTER RESPONSE 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will provide background on why the issue of expanding the 
military role in disaster response is important and to whom it is important.  
Additionally, it will provide an update on some of the lessons learned and DOD 
recommendations from reports on Hurricane Katrina released by Congress and 
the White House. 
B. BACKGROUND 
When Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, it was one of 
the worst natural disasters in American history.305  In the aftermath of the storm, 
the federal government’s response to the gulf coast received sharp criticism as 
being inadequate and too slow.  Citizens and lawmakers demanded to know why 
fellow Americans in the gulf coast failed to receive a quality federal response to 
the disaster.  Many also questioned why the military wasn’t called in sooner to 
help the obviously overwhelmed state and local governments, particularly after 
the levees were breached in the city of New Orleans. 
The issue concerning expansion of the military’s role in disaster response 
was first introduced by President Bush on September 15, 2005; just days after 
Hurricane Katrina struck the gulf coast states.306  During a speech in Louisiana, 
President Bush recommended that Congress consider expanding the powers of 
the military during future catastrophic disasters.  This suggested that the military 
might become the nation’s lead responder to catastrophic events.307 
At the President’s request, executive and legislative branches of 
government conducted investigations and released lessons learned reports on 
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the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina to find some answers.  
Hearings were held by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee to examine the military response to Hurricane Katrina.308  
Congressman Tom Davis, Chairman of the House Select Bipartisan Committee 
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, also led 
hearings for the House. 
Three primary reports outlining lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina 
were released:  the White House report, The Federal Response to Hurricane 
Katrina: Lessons Learned, Feb 2006; the Senate report from the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still 
Unprepared, May 2006; and the House report, A Failure of Initiative, Feb 2006.  
Each report outlined comprehensive lessons learned and comments on various 
DHS and DOD/Military issues to be addressed. 
C. REVIEW OF HURRICANE KATRINA LESSONS LEARNED 
1. White House Report 
The White House report acknowledged the failure of federal, state and 
local authorities to prepare and respond to Hurricane Katrina.  The document 
lists 125 recommendations on how the government should deal with the next 
catastrophe and 11 critical actions that were to be completed before June 1, 
2006.309 
Feedback for the Department of Homeland Security focused on ensuring 
there is effective integration of all federal search and rescue by leading an 
interagency review of applicable policies and procedures.310  The investigation 
revealed that it is imperative to design and build a unified system that includes 
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federal, state, local, community, and individual.311  Additionally, the report 
stressed that DOD and DHS should make it a priority to jointly plan response 
activities and ensure integration of both the guard and active duty forces.312 
The discussion on the DOD began by crediting them as being one of the 
only federal departments able to translate Presidential decisions into operational 
capabilities.  This is not to say, however, that DOD must take a lead role based 
on this capability.  The White House acknowledged that because the DOD has a 
critical mission overseas, the solution cannot simply be “let the Department of 
Defense do it.”313  The report further stressed that unified command functions 
and interagency processes must be improved.314 
The section that addressed the Congress warned that Congressional 
committees can produce competing initiatives and requirements that can 
contradict each other.  The White House emphasized that there must be an effort 
to embrace a risk-based approach to funding of DHS priorities.315  It also 
stressed that more challenging, yet realistic, national response scenarios need to 
be developed to enhance capabilities-based planning for DHS.316   
2. Congressional Reports 
a. Senate Report 
A bipartisan committee (referred to as the Committee) examined 
the actions of local, state and Federal departments and agencies.317  The 
Committee “conducted a long and thorough investigation”318 of the response to 
Hurricane Katrina.  The process of gathering information resulted in 22 public 
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hearings that drew 85 witnesses.319  The final Senate report is over 700 pages, 
containing 86 findings and 185 recommendations. 
Most of the Committee’s efforts were focused on the initial 
response in New Orleans.320  This is because over 1,500 people died in New 
Orleans alone.  In the Gulf Coast, “tens of thousands suffered without basic 
essentials for almost a week.”321 
In the Senate Report, there were four pervasive, overarching failures that 
were noted:   
1) Long-term warnings were unheeded and government officials 
neglected to prepare for the forewarned catastrophe.   
 
2) Insufficient actions or poor decisions were made by government 
officials in the days immediately before landfall. 
 
3) Systems relied upon by officials to support response efforts failed. 
 
4) Government officials at all levels failed to provide effective 
leadership.322 
 
When looking at how the DOD performed, the Committee 
categorized the response into three distinct phases.323  The first phase was: 
planning and preparation for deployment of forces that might be requested by 
FEMA.  The timeline for this phase was the week prior to landfall.  The following 
actions summarize this phase:  teleconferences with various interagencies, 
identification of capabilities, resources and supplies that could provide support 
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and pre-deployment of personnel and equipment closer to the affected 
regions.324 
The Second phase was: gathering information on the situation.  
The timeline for the second phase was during and immediately after landfall.  
During this phase, significant information was lacking, primarily due to DOD 
officials relying on press or media reports for information.  In line with the NRP, 
the DOD waited for FEMA to request specific missions and identify support 
needed. They also waited for DHS to update them on the situation, contributing 
to a lack of situational awareness during the response.325 
The third phase was simply: response.  This phase was 
characterized by improvement needed in DOD’s ability to integrate the military’s 
response into the overall response effort.  During Katrina, there were a large 
number of ground troops already responding to the disaster (Guard) that needed 
to coordinate and integrate with active duty forces deployed to support the effort.  
Response to requests also needed better coordination and more effective 
communication among military units.  For example, as discussed above with the 
Coast Guard, better communication avoids having different emergency response 
agencies or military units conducting missions to rescue the same person three 
or four times. 
The Committee also made seven foundational recommendations 
designed to make the nation’s emergency response system “strong, agile, 
effective, and robust.”326 
The first recommendation is: to abolish FEMA and replace it with a 
stronger, more capable structure, known as the National Preparedness and 
Response Authority (NPRA).327 
                                            
324 Senate Report, 26-11 to 26-12. 
325 Ibid, 26-12. 
326 Ibid, 18. 
327 Ibid. 
 76
The second recommendation is: to endow the new organization 
(NPRA) with responsibilities core to preparing for and responding to disasters.328 
The third recommendation is: to enhance regional operations to 
provide better coordination between federal and state agencies by establishing 
regional strike teams.329  The strike teams would consist of a designed Federal 
Coordinating Officer (FCO), a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), federal 
liaisons and personnel trained in public affairs, incident management, 
relief/recovery and communications.330 
The fourth recommendation is: to build a government-wide 
operations center to improve situational awareness and interagency 
coordination.331  This recommendation combines three interagency coordinating 
structures into one integrated entity.  The new National Operations Center 
(NOC)332 would replace these three structures: 
The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) 
The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) 
The Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG).333 
The fifth recommendation is: for all levels of government to renew 
and sustain commitments to the nation’s emergency management system.334  
The Committee expects the Administration and DHS to ensure Federal leaders of 
all response agencies understand their responsibilities/roles under the NRP, 
maintain the necessary resources required to carry out planning and train on 
NIMS, NRP and other operational plans.  DHS and NPRA (potential organization 
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to replace FEMA) must fully integrate private and nonprofit sectors into planning 
preparedness initiatives.335 
The sixth recommendation is: to strengthen underpinnings of the 
nation’s disaster and catastrophe response.336  Despite imperfections, the NRP 
and NIMS represent the best approach for a national, multi-agency emergency 
response.  Federal, State and local officials must commit to working together to 
improve the national emergency management system while supporting the NRP 
and NIMS.337 
The seventh recommendation is: to improve the nation’s 
catastrophic response capability.338  DHS should ensure that the Catastrophic 
Incident Annex (CIA) is understood by federal agencies that have responsibilities 
under the annex.  DHS must also commit to completing and publishing the 
Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) and supporting documents.  Finally, the 
plans must be coordinated with regions and states to ensure they understand, 
train and exercise appropriately to the plans.339 
b. House Report  
On September 15, 2005, House Resolution 437 was approved by 
the House of Representatives.  This resolution created the Select Bipartisan 
Committee (referred to as Select Committee) to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina.340  The Committee was charged with 
conducting: 
a full and complete investigation and study and to report its findings to 
the House not later than February 15, 2006, regarding— (1) the 
development, coordination, and execution by local, State, and Federal 
authorities of emergency response plans and other activities in 
                                            
335 Ibid, 20. 
336 Senate Report, 20. 
337 Ibid, 20-21. 
338 Ibid, 21. 
339 Ibid. 
340 A Failure of Initiative, ix. 
 78
preparation for Hurricane Katrina; and (2) the local, State, and Federal 
government response to Hurricane Katrina.341 
Due to the Committee’s short deadline and refusal of the White 
House to provide access to essential documents, “key questions remain 
unanswered.”342   The results of the House investigation revealed over 90 
findings and described critical failures at all levels of government.343 
Two areas of emphasis in the report were coordination and 
communication.  The Select Committee found that greatly improved mechanisms 
for coordination are needed at all levels of response.  They reported that 
improved coordination would have provided for better military support during 
Hurricane Katrina.344  Based on their investigation, the Committee confirmed that 
the coordination between DOD, FEMA and Louisiana led to a slow response.345  
They also found that coordination between DOD and DHS was ineffective.346 
Additionally, although the Coast Guard responded immediately to 
the disaster and saved thousands of lives, the Select Committee also found that 
improved communication and coordination between the Coast Guard and other 
first responders is still needed.347  For example, multiple response agencies on 
the ground during a disaster to assist victims make it imperative that the Coast 
Guard coordinate and share information with other first responders.  This is 
especially true while conducting search and rescue missions.  Better coordination 
will help avoid duplication of effort or inadvertently missing victims that still need 
to be assisted or rescued. 
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The Select Committee also found that communication between 
DOD, DHS and especially FEMA were weak due to process problems and lack of 
information sharing.348  The report also suggested that an information-sharing 
protocol would have enhanced communications, coordination, and situational 
awareness within military units.349  Additionally, they noted that by focusing on 
integrating the Guard and active forces, the military response can become more 
seamless and provide better situational awareness to all levels of leadership.350 
The Select Committee’s investigations also found that a general 
lack of understanding of states’ capabilities by the DOD and military capabilities 
by the state hindered the request for military assistance process.351  One reason 
may have been due to the lack of participants from the federal, state and local 
levels during NORTHCOM-sponsored emergency exercises prior to Hurricane 
Katrina.  Greater involvement in exercises from multiple agencies at all levels of 
government and the public sector will allow the establishment of key relationships 
that can prove valuable during an emergency.  Exercising together allows trust to 
build and working relationships establish before the emergency or disaster hits.  
Additionally, it allows agencies to learn more about the capabilities offered by 
other organizations. 
During Hurricane Katrina, the DOD initially drafted its own RFAs 
and forwarded them to FEMA to copy and send back.352  This was because 
DOD obviously had knowledge of their own capabilities and capacity to support 
various disaster response operations.  FEMA, on the other hand, was less 
familiar with DOD capabilities and could not initially assess what DOD resources 
might be needed to perform a mission.  At the unclassified level, the NRP could 
be a forum to better identify and integrate DOD capabilities. 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results from a majority of the hearings and reports on the federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina agreed there was there was a failure of 
government at all levels to plan, prepare for and respond aggressively to 
Hurricane Katrina.353  There was also consensus that within the federal 
government construct, unity of effort and unity of command/leadership needs to 
be examined and improved for disaster response.354  Better coordination 
between various federal, state and local actors will be essential for a successful 
federal disaster response capability in the future. 
As far as the military is concerned, both DHS and DOD should plan and 
prepare for significant roles during a major catastrophe.355  For the DOD, war 
efforts overseas resulted in some critical equipment item shortages and reduced 
inventories during the Hurricane Katrina.  The reality is that shortages are also 
likely in future disasters.  Therefore, a plan must be devised to mitigate the 
impact on disaster response efforts.   
Flexibility is essential to the timely use of federal active-duty troops to 
provide assistance to a state following a catastrophic disaster (natural or 
manmade).  The general consensus, however, is that federalizing disaster 
response is not a good course of action.356  DOD might be required to 
temporarily assume the lead for the federal response during catastrophic 
incidents only.357  However, the scope and duration of DOD’s role during a 
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catastrophic incident need to be defined.  Additionally, training requirements and 
cost of training must be calculated and considered before any potential addition 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS 
…Americans had every reason to believe that two disasters hit the Gulf 
Coast—the hurricanes and the federal response.358 
 
A. CONCLUSIONS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What is a National Response Plan (NRP) and what disaster response 
role is designated for the DOD active-duty military? 
 
The President of the United States mandated, through Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), a new National Response Plan (NRP) be 
developed to “align Federal coordinating structures, capabilities, and resources 
into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident 
management.”359  The result was a 426-page document developed by multiple 
agencies and released in December 2004. 
The NRP serves as a roadmap to guide the nation’s federal response 
during a domestic disaster.  The document was built on the foundational model of 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  Using the comprehensive 
framework of the NIMS, the NRP provides national-level policy and operational 
direction between government and private sector entities.360 
Within the plan, the DOD has a designated supporting role in disaster 
response under Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).  DSCA is defined 
as DOD support provided by Federal military forces, DOD agencies and 
components, DOD civilians and contract personnel in response to requests for 
assistance (RFA) during domestic incidents.361 
RFAs are usually received from a civilian primary or lead agency 
whenever resources at the local, State, or Federal level are deemed to be 
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overwhelmed or incapable of effectively responding to an incident or natural 
disaster.362  The Secretary of Defense authorizes DSCA for domestic incidents 
as directed by the President or “when appropriate under the circumstances and 
applicable laws.”363 
Does the current construct of the NRP give the U.S military and other 
key agencies the ability to share critical information during a federal 
disaster response? 
 
The NRP does provide appropriate and comprehensive coordinating 
mechanisms to facilitate the sharing of critical information among federal 
agencies for disaster response.  The challenge, however, is getting individual 
agencies and actors to actually share the information with the right people, in a 
timely and effective manner. 
The Wall Street Journal authors, Cooper and Block concede in their book, 
Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security that “pertinent, 
accurate, real-time information flowed in great waves through government 
agencies from all manner of responsible sources.”364  Nevertheless, they argue 
that during Hurricane Katrina there were many instances where “information sat 
unused, unread, and even dismissed by the very people charged with ensuring 
that timely news about disasters made its way to the top levels of the federal 
government.”365 
The NRP provides a forum to successfully implement its established 
information-sharing protocols and coordinating mechanisms within the plan.  
Individual attention, responsibility and accountability, however, are the key 
ingredients to moving federal agencies even closer to the goal of achieving an 
effective federal disaster response.  
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Did the active duty military performance during Hurricane Katrina 
versus DHS performance provide evidence that greater DOD authority 
is needed during a federal response to a domestic catastrophe? 
 
When considering challenges that complicated the government response 
to Katrina, an expanded military authority would not have guaranteed a 
successful disaster response.  Rather, a better strategy and important area of 
focus ought to be upon the implementation process of the NRP. 
One immediate goal should be to update the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident 
Annex (CIA) and immediately release the Catastrophic Incident Supplement 
(CIS).  This will to provide more clarity of roles, responsibilities and operational 
actions to be taken during a major disaster.   
Additionally, organizational training on the CIA and CIS when released is 
essential.  DOD, DHS and FEMA must work closely with each other to iron out 
operational procedures under the NRP.  This will avoid “playing it by ear” during 
a catastrophic disaster response. 
Examination of the DOD and DHS response to Hurricane Katrina did not 
provide sufficient evidence that expanding DOD authority during a major 
domestic disaster is the right step to take.  Although the military does bring 
unique skills and capabilities to the table, the role of DSCA under the NRP helps 
protect the delicate balance of state sovereignty and federalism.  It also helps 
preserve civil-military relations.  As such, it is likely the active-duty military role 
will remain one of support under a civilian lead during disaster response. 
 
Will placing the military in the lead role solve the federal government’s 
disaster response problems? 
 
A plan that places the military in the lead role will not solve many of the 
issues highlighted in the lessons learned reports from the White House and 
Congress.  Likewise, the NRP itself will not correct problems like those 
encountered by the federal government during Hurricane Katrina.  Instead, 
building the capacity for an effective federal disaster response, not just a plan, is 
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an important step toward addressing some of the federal disaster response 
challenges. 
Continuous updating of the NRP is needed to ensure current and 
applicable information is incorporated.  For example, one of the NRP’s shortfalls 
is its failure to determine necessary actions if an overwhelmed local or state 
authority is not “capable of making the incident assessments and informed 
resource requests necessary to obtain DOD assistance.”366  Once the plan 
contains relevant and accurate information, timely dissemination of the updated 
information to all participating agencies is a must. 
Accordingly, it is essential that DHS, DOD, National Guard, State and 
local responders work together more closely to solve federal response problems.  
Many issues require long-term solutions that must be accompanied by funding, 
manpower and other critical resources.  An interoperable communications 
system is needed for a unified local, State and Federal response.  Joint planning 
and training will allow emergency managers to more effectively communicate and 
mount a timely, coordinated response.  Agencies at all levels need to work better 
as a whole to build interoperability across entire regions.  Expanded exposure 
and training on the NRP will pay dividend in a future response. 
The Senate Report, Hurricane Katrina A Nation Still Unprepared, agreed 
that “inadequate training in the details of the…National Response Plan was a 
contributing factor in shortcomings in the government’s performance.”367  Placing 
the military in a lead role will not solve this shortcoming.  Individual agency 
responsibility and accountability for NRP training will help ensure all 
organizations and personnel are operating from the same playbook. 
One fact is clear: the military alone cannot achieve an effective 
government response.  Ultimately, a successful federal disaster response 
demands coordination and cooperation among multiple agencies at the local, 
State and Federal levels. 
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B. CHALLENGES 
From hurricanes and pandemics and to earthquakes and terrorism, the 
United States is grappling with the prospect of a host of cataclysmic 
events.368 
 
Under the National Response Plan, DHS, EPR and FEMA are listed as 
the agencies responsible for logistics during a disaster.369  Hurricane Katrina 
showed, however, that “FEMA lacked the tools to track the status of shipments, 
interfering with the management of supplying food, water, ice and other vital 
commodities to those in need across the Gulf Coast.”370  In fact, many victims of 
the storm needlessly suffered hardships due to FEMA’s inability to perform this 
critical function.  For example, an unfilled request for portable toilets at the 
Superdome left “more than 20,000 people …without working plumbing for nearly 
a week.”371 
A robust logistics capability must be in place during disaster response.  If 
the responsible organizations under the NRP do not have the capability to 
effectively execute this mission, a new solution must be sought.  Future federal 
disaster response will face the same challenges if not resolved.  DOD may be 
able to provide direction and training to DHS in the logistics arena to enhance 
their disaster response capability. 
Additionally, although organizational structures are in place within the 
NRP to help facilitate critical information sharing between various emergency 
response agencies, information sharing among DOD units remains a challenge.  
The House report, A Failure of Initiative, admitted that during their investigation, 
“the Select Committee could find no reporting requirements for sharing important 
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information between DOD entities.”372  In fact, the report listed the lack of “an 
information sharing protocol that would have enhanced joint situational 
awareness”373 among military units during response to Katrina as an official 
finding. 
The DOD will need to concentrate on tackling this challenge so that critical 
information can quickly reach the consumers and decision makers who need it 
most.  Events like September 11, Hurricane Katrina and the war on terrorism 
continue to highlight the information-sharing challenges that still exist within the 
DOD and nationally among various agencies. 
The coordinating structures within the NRP are an admirable first step 
toward helping the command, control, communication and intelligence efforts in 
the emergency response arena. The plans look pretty good on paper.  In reality, 
however, implementation of those plans is much tougher due to technological, 
procedural, cultural and other challenges. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
…experts agree that it’s not a matter of “if” but “when” another large-
scale disaster will occur somewhere in the United States.374 
 
1. Exercise and Plan for the Worst-Case Scenario 
All joint, interagency, local, State and Federal-level exercises need to plan 
and test for the worst case scenario.  For example, during initial stages of 
Hurricane Katina, almost all land line communication and cell phone service was 
inoperable.  Satellite phone, fax and scan capability were lacking, yet critical to 
establishing communication.  This created difficulty coordinating and 
communicating valuable information among various military organizations and 
between emergency response agencies.  Vital information and situational 
                                            
372 House Report, 224-225. 
373 House Report, 224. 
374 Jonathan Walters and Donald F. Kettl. “The Katrina Breakdown,” 261. 
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updates could not be relayed to first responders in a timely manner.  Those who 
initially needed information the most were often the last to receive updates. 
It is unacceptable to send emergency responders into a disaster area 
without the ability to communicate with units in the rear or other responders.  
Future exercises must learn lessons from September 11 and Hurricane Katrina.  
Development of similar catastrophic scenarios to test emergency responders and 
their ability to maintain situational awareness and communicate when standard 
systems are not operational is imperative.  Additionally, there must be a robust 
communication outage plan in place for future civilian and military disaster 
responders. 
Finally, when a worst- case scenario exercise is conducted, it should be 
mandatory for lessons learned to be addressed within a specified timeframe.  For 
example, a hurricane scenario exercise named “Pam” was conducted in July 
2004 with a follow-up workshop just one month before Hurricane Katina hit the 
Gulf Coast.375  The exercise tested emergency responders in a nearly identical 
hurricane scenario as Katrina.376  The problem was, lessons learned and 
necessary corrective actions were not implemented prior to Hurricane Katrina’s 
fury. 
Clearly, disaster response at all levels of government would have been 
significantly improved if the lessons from Pam had been addressed in a timely 
manner.  In fact, the House Report, A Failure of Initiative, agreed that “Hurricane 
Pam’s striking resemblance to Katrina in force and devastation” left many 
“wondering at the failure to anticipate, and plan for, these essentials.”377  The 
following was also listed as a finding: “implementation of lessons learned from 
Hurricane Pam was incomplete.”378  Future lessons learned must be heeded and 
challenges tackled immediately.  As Katrina showed, lives depend upon it. 
                                            
375 Senate Report, 16-19. 
376 See Table 2 for comparison of “Pam” scenario to Hurricane Katrina. 
377 A Failure of Initiative, 83. 
378 Ibid, 83. 
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2. Avoid Over Reliance on Military Assistance 
Relying on active duty military forces to “save the day” during domestic 
disasters is problematic.  Whether performing permissible law enforcement 
duties or other first responder assignments, the military must remain in a support 
role under civilian authorities.  Assigning DOD a lead role in disaster response 
has the danger of deterring the creation of an effective civilian capacity and 
capability to perform.   
“Calling in the cavalry” during a domestic emergency might tempt local 
and state civil authorities to rely so heavily on the military “back-up” plan that they 
avoid training and equipping their first responders to an appropriate proficiency 
level.  This tendency may simply be human nature.  If one believes the job can 
be done faster, more efficiently, effectively or cheaper with another organization, 
it’s easy to acquiesce and say “let them do it.”  It would be a moral hazard if the 
federal government (particularly the military) is seen as the only organization 
“capable” of responding to a domestic disaster; catastrophic or not.  This type of 
attitude could negatively impact funding for first responder training and 
equipment.  There is also the potential that increased federal involvement could 
trample on states’ rights and negatively impact civil-military relations.  The results 
could ultimately diminish confidence in the separation of powers and infringe 
upon individual civil liberties. 
3. Equip DHS emergency response organizations and first 
responders to effectively perform their jobs  
We at Northern Command, we don’t care necessarily whether it’s 
FEMA, DHS or DOD in the lead.  What is important is getting the 
American people the assistance they deserve and need.379 
 
One of the best ways to ensure the American people get the assistance 
they need during domestic emergencies is to fully equip local and state 
emergency responders with adequate funding, personnel, training and supplies.  
                                            
379 “Q & A: Admiral Timothy Keating; Commander NORAD and NORTHCOM,” The San 
Diego Union Tribune, December 11, 2005, 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20051211/news_1e11qnda.html  (accessed on May 25, 
2006). 
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First responders have a tough enough job to perform without having to cut 
corners due to insufficient funding, equip that is not interoperable or minimal 
emergency response training. 
DHS must make it a top priority to support their emergency management 
agencies with qualified and experienced leaders that will ensure their personnel 
have the necessary assets to perform their mission.  If this means begging for 
additional federal funding; then let the begging begin.  There is no substitute for 
preparation when it comes to successfully performing a mission. 
Finding new methods to help first responders perform their jobs could 
prove valuable.  The Senate Report even suggested that “DHS could adopt 
military models of logistics, training, career development, and centralized incident 
management to improve its ability to function independently.”380 
Ultimately, DHS emergency managers and first responders must be set up 
for success.  That means acquiring the proper tools for each agency, by any 
means necessary.  The dedicated and hard working DHS personnel deserve the 
best and America expects nothing less. 
D. SUMMARY 
The American public seeks reassurance that the federal government can 
adequately respond to the needs of its citizens after a large scale natural or 
manmade disaster on American soil.  The National Response Plan is a solid 
roadmap to guide federal agencies toward achieving a well coordinated, effective 
federal disaster response.  However, updates to the plan are still needed as well 
as implementation training at all levels of the federal government.   
Expanding the military’s role to lead the disaster response effort is not the 
best strategy for improving federal disaster response.  The roles and missions for 
active-duty military forces within the construct of Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities can and will provide necessary support to a civilian lead federal 
agency while preserving civil-military relations. 
                                            
380 Senate Report, 26-70. 
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A renewed focus on emergency management budgets, manning levels, 
personnel qualification, training and interoperability will help ensure successful 
implementation of the National Response Plan during the next domestic disaster.  
Rear Admiral Dennis Sirois, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast 
Guard, reminded Congress during his testimony before the United States House 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina that “We must also continue to improve operational integration 
at all levels of government in order to improve emergency response 
communications, planning and execution.”381  Nothing could be truer. 
The American people will continue to look to the federal government for 
assistance during an emergency.  The successful implementation of an updated 
National Response Plan will hopefully allow them to deliver and restore 
America’s confidence in the government’s ability to aid her citizens following a 
disaster. 
                                            
381 : “Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the 
Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama,” Testimony of Rear 
Admiral Dennis Sirois, U.S. Coast Guard, on the Coast Guard’s Role in Disaster Response. 
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Figure 3: Procedures for Requesting DSCA (From, Joint Publication 3-26, 




Figure 4: Saffir-Simpson Scale Reflecting Hurricane Intensity (From, NOAA’s 
National Climatic Data Center Technical Report #2005-01, 




Figure 5: Hurricane Katrina Travel Path and Intensity (From, Climate of 2005: 





Figure 6: Hurricane Katrina at Maximum Intensity (From, NOAA-18: Polar 
Orbiter Image, NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center Technical 





Table 1: DOD Assigned Roles Under the ESFs (From, Senate Report, 





24 NRP, p. ESF #1-4. 
25 NRP, p. ESF #2-12. 
26 NRP, pp. ESF #3-5 to 3-8. 
27 NRP, p. ESF #4-4. 
28 NRP, pp. ESF #5-1 to 5-6. 
29 NRP, p. ESF #6-6. 
30 NRP, pp. ESF #7-1 to 7-6. 
31 NRP, p. ESF #8-9. 
32 NRP, p. ESF #9-6. 
33 NRP, p. ESF #lo-10. 
34 NRP, p. ESF #11-10. 
35 NRP, p. ESF #12-4. 
36 NRP, p. ESF #13-6. 
37 NRP, p. ESF #14-5. 
38 NRP, p. ESF #15-5. 
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Table 2: “Pam” Exercise Scenario Compared to Katrina (From, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, DHS/FEMA Initial Response 
Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA, February 
13, 2006, vii) 
 
 1 
Initially the National Hurricane Center reported that Katrina made landfall as a Category 4. But 
the storm was described as a Category 3 in a report released by the National Hurricane Center 
on December 20, 2005.  
2 
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, February 10, 2006.  
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